How China won the India-Pakistan war

First, the Chini-Pakistani dosti

It is hardly news that China has been arming Pakistan—or that China has been arming Pakistan specifically to harm India. There has long been incontrovertible evidence that Beijing was the chief patron of Kashmiri terrorists: 

A decade ago, images released routinely by terrorist organisations after major attacks in Jammu & Kashmir, revealed they were taken from Chinese-manufactured body cameras.

 

Ditto for encrypted messaging devices used by terrorists for communication. Security agencies have red flagged the fact that the Pakistani Army regularly received supplies of weapons, cameras, and communication devices from China, which on many occasions, were loaned out to extremists.

Reminder: China occupies a healthy chunk of Kashmir—though neither India or Pakistan likes to talk about it. 

Thick as thieves: When the government revoked Kashmir’s special status, it moved Beijing and Pakistan even closer together. Today, China supplies 81% of Pakistan’s imported weaponry—ranging from advanced fighter jets, missiles, radars and air-defence systems. Pakistan is also co-developing weapon systems with Chinese companies. And it made no secret of its Chinese arsenal during the war—proudly displaying visuals of JF-17s armed with PL-15E and PL-10 missiles. For the very first time, the Indian military acknowledged the role of Chinese weaponry—showcasing debris of a shot-down missile.

Quote to note: Soon after the Pahalgam terror attack—and as Islamabad braced for Indian reprisal—China’s foreign minister Wang Yi told his Pakistani counterpart Ishaq Dar:

China always supports Pakistan’s resolute implementation of counter-terrorism actions.. As Pakistan’s ironclad friend and all-weather strategic cooperative partner, China fully understands Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and supports Pakistan in safeguarding its sovereignty and security interests.

OTOH, the bad news for Pakistan: There are strict limits to this bromance—as proved in 1971 during the Bangladesh war. Andrew Small writes in his book, “The China Pakistan Axis’:

As the end of the war grew ever nearer, a Chinese intervention looked more and more like Pakistan’s only possible escape route from self-inflicted disaster. But ultimately Pakistan would lose half its population, a fifth of its territory, and see ninety-three thousand of its soldiers become prisoners of war without even a token skirmish on the Sino-Indian border.

China prefers to stay out of the battleground—more so in this case:

Beijing does not want a major military escalation in its neighborhood for both security and economic reasons. With the ongoing China-U.S. trade war, China does not want to hurt its economic relations with India — the bilateral trade volume between the two crossed the $100 billion mark back in 2021.

Besides, a war does little good to China’s $28 billion Belt and Road Initiative projects invested in Pakistan. Btw, there was little sign that Beijing was willing to replenish Pakistan’s arsenal if the battle had dragged on: “But Beijing ‘doesn’t want an all-out war’ between its Himalayan neighbours, so there was ‘a sweet spot for China regarding the nature and duration of this conflict’.”

Bigger fish in the sea: Beijing is also more focused on its maritime front—asserting its rights in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and South China Sea. It isn’t interested in getting tangled up in battles that are less critical to its territorial claims. 

And it’s Beijing for the win… !

Over the past week, New Delhi, Islamabad and—who else—Donald Trump have all claimed victory. But the true winner is China—as a military power, arms dealer and India’s nemesis.

A free weapons test: China has not stepped onto the battlefield for more than 40 years. During the same time, it has been steadily bulking its military might—with cutting-edge technology. Pakistan’s battle offered a highly valuable and free field test against “European assets.” If the Chengdu J-10C brought down even one French-made Rafale jet—as multiple media reports confirm—that's a big win for Beijing. 

Quote to note: The Chinese weaponry also unveiled a new, unwelcome reality for India: 

“Beijing’s long-standing support for Islamabad – through hardware, training, and now increasingly AI-enabled targeting – has quietly shifted the tactical balance,” said Craig Singleton, a senior fellow at the US-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “This isn’t just a bilateral clash anymore; it’s a glimpse of how Chinese defense exports are reshaping regional deterrence.”

Know thine enemy: Beyond weapons, the battle also tested military strategy: “Chinese and Pakistani militaries have also engaged in increasingly sophisticated joint air, sea and land exercises, including combat simulations and even crew-swapping drills.” India’s response also offered priceless intelligence on its military:

Chinese military intelligence teams would be eager to garner information on any Indian use of air defences and launches of cruise and ballistic missiles - not just in terms of flight paths and accuracy but command and control information, analysts and diplomats say. Any deployment of India's BrahMos supersonic cruise missile - a weapon it developed jointly with Russia - would be of particular interest, some analysts say, given they do not believe it has been used in combat.

There were Chinese military advisers in Pakistan—getting a front-seat view of the war—lapping every bit of data shared by the generals. 

Perfect PR for Chinese dhanda: The top four weapons exporters in the world are the United States—which has 43% of the pie—followed by France and Russia. China is a distant fourth at 5.9%—with nearly two-thirds of its arms exports going to a single country: Pakistan. If Chinese weapons did indeed perform well—especially its jets—the news will be a “powerful advertisement” for its defence industry. Experts say the battle offers a well-timed window of opportunity: 

With Russia set back as a result of its invasion of Ukraine, I’m sure the Chinese have begun pushing hard at Moscow’s traditional markets — e.g., Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and Sudan — to secure big-ticket sales.

Point to note: A number of Western experts are reluctant to award Chinese jets a win—and instead question the Indian military: 

If reports of India losing multiple jets holds up, it would raise serious questions about the IAF’s readiness, not just its platforms. The Rafales are modern, but warfighting is about integration, coordination, and survivability — not just headline acquisitions.

But where does that leave India?

Whether China enters the battlefield or not, New Delhi now faces a far greater threat in its neighbourhood:

According to defence analyst Pravin Sawhney, the popular notion of a two-front-war visualized as a battle that India will have to fight on two fronts, with China and Pakistan, has now metamorphosed into a ‘one front reinforced war’.

 

“India has now to contend not just with Pakistan. A war with its traditional rival Pakistan now also involves China, because China and Pakistan have developed a strong military relationship, including significant defence interoperability,” [said] Sawhney.

All of which wins Rahul Gandhi the ‘I told you so’ award. This is what he said back in 2022: 

Ofc, it isn’t clear how New Delhi was supposed to prevent this outcome—given Beijing’s tendency to nibble on our Ladakh border.

What about our pal Putin? Sadly, our dosti with Russia has proved to be far less ‘iron-clad’. Although Moscow condemned the Pahalgam attacks, it did not bat for India when it launched Operation Sindoor. Instead, the Kremlin made the usual noises calling on both sides to exercise restraint. Reminder: Russia offered to be a mediator soon after the Pulwama attacks—knowing full well that India rejects any third-party intervention. This time around, Trump did the needful, so to speak.

More worrying is the growing camaraderie between Russia and Pakistan: 

[S]ince Moscow and Islamabad have expanded their areas and levels of cooperation over the last decade, Russia is no longer in a position to put pressure on Pakistan regarding cross-border terrorism. With Russian and Pakistani special forces now conducting annual anti-terrorist exercises and foreign ministry officials highlighting the “positive dynamics” and prospects of counter-terrorism cooperation, it is unlikely that Moscow would publicly call out Islamabad, even if it does suspect the Pakistani intelligence services of having links to terrorist groups operating in Kashmir.

Reminder: Since the Ukraine invasion, Moscow has leaned heavily on Beijing to blunt the effect of Western sanctions. During the same time, New Delhi has moved closer to Washington—and its allies:

At the same time, India has slashed its dependence on Russian weapons by more than half. Between 2006 and 2010, about 80% of India’s major weapons came from Russia. Over the past four years, that figure has fallen to about 38%, with more than half of Indian imports coming from the United States and allies like France and Israel.

So it isn’t all surprising that the Kremlin prefers to play it safe on the subcontinent. 

The bottomline: For the past decade, New Delhi has insisted that it won’t pick sides in a “multipolar world”—thinking it was clever to stay on the sidelines of every fight. But that strategy has left it with no real friends among the world’s great powers—be it the US, China, Russia or even the EU. And that’s the real lesson of this brief but unsettling conflict.

Reading list 

Mint has an excellent analysis of the deepening China-Pakistan alliance. The Diplomat explains what China wants. CNN is best on what the battle told us about Chinese weapons—and why it's a win for Beijing. Reuters reports on why battlefield intelligence is priceless for Beijing. Indian Express explains why Russia won’t be rushing to our rescue any time soon.