As we saw in part one, the ‘one Indian, one vote’ principle has created a looming democratic crisis for one simple reason: There are far more Indians in North India than South India. Hence, the long-delayed 2021 census—which will lead to a reallocation of Parliament seats based on current population numbers—will trigger a North vs South war not seen since the early days of independence. So what’s a well-meaning democracy to do? We look at some of the proposed solutions.
Editor’s note: In part one, we laid out the lopsided growth (or lack thereof) in India’s population. We also explained why delimitation according to the current formula will result in the near irrelevance of South Indian states—at least on the national stage.
The North vs South divide: Why does this matter?
Good nationalists will dismiss all this heartache over delimitation as plain unpatriotic. We’re all Indians, after all. But the reality is that population numbers affect not just who gets how many seats—-but also who gets how much money. Here’s why.
At New Delhi’s mercy: In India, states have some measure of political independence, but very little financial independence. The Union government currently receives roughly two-thirds of all the tax revenue raised, while being responsible for just over a third of all expenses. OTOH, most of the spending is done by states—on everything from social welfare to police and education. They are therefore dependent on tax revenue distributed by New Delhi—and the many Central sector schemes and grants (explained at great length in this Big Story).
The new formula: The government has made the population of a state a key factor in the formula for distributing tax revenue. Until 2015, the Finance Commission used the 1971 census to decide who gets how much. Now, it uses the 2011 census to do the same. Thanks to this change, there is an even greater disparity between more and less populous states.
As of 2013, Uttar Pradesh (17.94%) and Bihar (10.06%) got a huge slice—compared to southern states like Tamil Nadu (4.08%), Karnataka (3.65%), and Kerala(1.92%). The shares of Karnataka and Kerala actually fell when the 2011 census became a criterion—while Bihar and Maharashtra (6.32%) saw their shares rise. When the new census is completed in 2026, it will further skew the distribution of revenue.
Adding to the anxiety: The Prime Minister’s Office recently announced plans to pour money into the industrialisation of northern states—to make them manufacturing hubs:
The Centre is focusing on bridging the North-South divide by encouraging investments in underdeveloped northern states, promoting infrastructure development, and creating policies to foster regional equity in manufacturing, according to two people close to the matter.
This is an excellent idea per se—but it adds to the anxieties of South Indian states who resent footing the bill with their tax revenue.
Also this: The government has leveraged its tax kitty to favour states critical to the BJP. Last year—right before the Lok Sabha elections—the government announced road building projects worth Rs 33 billion (3,300 crore) in UP. In Maharashtra, Modi unveiled the Rs 178.4 billion (17,840 crores) Atal Setu bridge—plus another Rs 127 billion (12,700 crore) in “world class infrastructure.” In February, he was in Gujarat—touting Rs 600 billion (60,000 crore) in funding for everything from road and rail to energy, health and urban development.
The big picture: From where the South Indian states are sitting, delimitation will be a double whammy—cementing North India’s role as kingmaker—and therefore as the most favoured child of any ruling party. The result is an almost comical fertility race—with RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat suggesting couples have three or more children (after decades of ‘ek ya do bas’). Meanwhile in Chennai:
Addressing a mass wedding event… Stalin referred to an old Tamil blessing, saying “That blessing doesn’t mean beget 16 children … But now a situation has arisen where people think they should literally raise 16 children and not a small and prosperous family,” he said. The situation he referred to is delimitation, he explained later.
Needless to say, no economist thinks popping out more kids is sound public policy—either in the North or South. And the Prime Minister himself has framed family planning as an act of patriotism.
The path from representation to reconciliation…
It is unlikely that any government will take risk alienating the South—contrary to the doom and gloom speeches by its Chief Ministers. But it isn’t easy to both ensure fair representation of every Indian—and ensure fair representation of every state. Below are some models suggested by experts—none of them entirely satisfactory.
One: If we were to reapportion the current number of Parliament seats, we would have to actually take seats away from the southern states. So Alastair McMillan proposes increasing the size of the pie—which may be more palatable:
This has two clear advantages. First, increasing the number of MPs would address the ballooning size of constituencies, which hamstrings MPs’ responsiveness to constituents’ needs… Expanding the size of the house may also be more politically feasible than reapportioning the current number of seats. After all, representatives inherently question any arrangement that takes seats away from their state (which potentially places their own job on the chopping block) but may be less opposed to adding more seats.
The McMillan formula would require increasing the number of parliamentary seats from 545 to a staggering 848.
But, but, but: The South Indian states would still be dwarfed by the North—due to their lower population. This in turn will give the BJP a near-unbeatable advantage. Look at how the math plays out if Parliament were increased to 753 seats—based on the 2011 census:
For example, in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, a proportional increase in seats will be from 174 to 284 (a 63 percent increase). In the 2019 general elections, NDA won 156 of these 174 seats with a 90 percent winning rate. This readjustment of seats will lead to NDA receiving 255 seats just from four states, bringing them extremely close to the new majority mark of 377.
Two: Go the American way and turn the Rajya Sabha into a US Senate-like body. Each state gets the same number of seats—irrespective of size or population. This would also address another kind of injustice in representation—as Rajya Sabha members don’t even need to be ‘domiciled’ in the state they represent: “Here, Manipur has a single Rajya Sabha member, who does not even have to be from the state, while Uttar Pradesh has 31.”
But, but, but: Finance bills—which are critical to a state’s share of the revenue pot—do not need to be approved by the upper house. The core anxiety of southern CMs will remain unaddressed.
Three: Pranay Kotasthane echoes the RS reform suggestion—and recommends two more changes to address the South’s fears. First: Rather than fight over each state’s slice of the tax revenue pie—reduce the 58% mega-slice gobbled up by the union government. Allocate 60% to the states instead—since they pay more of the bills. Next: Carve up Uttar Pradesh to reduce its outsized clout:
UP today alone accounts for nearly 15% of the Lok Sabha strength. This is an unhealthy dominance for a Union of States. The fears against Delimitation are at their core arguments against increasing UP’s hold over the Union further. Breaking UP could then assuage many concerns. And we aren’t breaking any new ground here. In the past, Jan Sangh and the Bahujan Samaj Party have both spoken about splitting the unwieldy state into smaller parts.
But, but, but: The BJP is least likely to be open to this suggestion. Nor will any ruling party agree to cut back its share of the national purse.
Four: Chanchal Kumar advocates a ‘concessionary federalism’—which recognises “the unique confluence of economic and identity-related concerns in South India that evokes a distinct level of discontent.” Translation: Unlike Gujarat, Tamil Nadu is both angry at the “imposition” of Hindi and its share of tax revenue. Hence—aside from reforming the Rajya Sabha and giving more paisa to states—New Delhi should “adopt the principle of non-interference in matters of language, culture and other locally significant issues.” So no more banging on about national language, culture etc.
Five: Last but not least, maintain the current freeze until all states stabilize their population—and have similar fertility rates. Needless to say, South Indian pundits are most likely to advocate this path:)
But, but, but: For all the talk of “stabilisation,” the crisis of lopsided growth is only going to get worse as we move forward:
This North-South demographic divide will deepen further in the future. The north will continue to add significant numbers to India’s population while the south’s share will decline. For example, between 2011 and 2036, Kerala’s population will increase from 33 million to 37 million, whereas Bihar will add nearly 45 million people during the same period – an addition higher than the total population of Kerala.
In other words, a freeze on parliamentary seats will become increasingly unfair and undemocratic with each year.
The big plot twist: North-South migration
Debates over demographics often ignore a single outsized fact: the mass movement of Indians from the North to the South:
Recent research also shows a distinct southward shift in migration. Southern cities such as Bangalore, Hyderabad, Chennai, and Kochi are emerging as important migration destinations as they provide more regular employment, better incomes and stronger labour protections... An insightful analysis of return migration during the two waves of Covid-19... show that a significant chunk of migrants who left Mumbai, Kolkata and industrial cities in Gujarat during the pandemic did not return due to their harsh experience, and they seemed to be moving to Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
The trend is even more pronounced in the big cities. A recent study showed that 85% of out-of-state migrants in Bangalore came from just six states: Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
The political irony: is that many of these migrant workers do not participate in elections because they are almost permanently away from their villages. Data point to note: Official numbers consistently undercount migrant labour: “Alternative estimates suggest that there are over 100 million labour migrants in India comprising nearly 20% of the country’s workforce.”
Demographic dividend? Like many Western and East Asian countries, South India’s population is also aging. Migrant workers from North India offer a valuable and necessary resource. That is why states like Kerala are moving to lure them into becoming permanent residents:
To welcome outside migrants, Kerala, for example, has introduced various benefits for low-skilled inter-state migrants, such as health insurance, allowance for children’s education, and shared housing… Kerala’s policy initiatives for low-skilled migrant communities appear to also encourage more permanent, family-based migration.. The success of the Roshni scheme that bridges language barriers to encourage greater school enrolment among migrant children is a good illustration. Migrant children have counterbalanced Kerala’s dwindling school-age population and rejuvenated Kerala’s schools, and they provide potential human resource for the state’s future economic development.
If this becomes a bigger and wider trend, migration may become the most practical solution to lopsided population growth—and the political divide. Of course, there are equally strong political forces that resist such assimilation of migrants—both in the South and North.
The bottomline: South Indian states will soon discover that they can’t function without North Indian workers—and vice versa. It may help all sides to take a more “concessionary” approach to demographic dharma. Yes, civil wars loom on the horizon—but so does an opportunity for unprecedented national integration—no bullying needed.
Reading list
For solutions to the representation dilemma, read proposals by Chanchal Kumar, Milan Vaishnav and Jamie Hintson, Nitin Pai, Pranay Kotasthane, Mohammed Sanjir Alam and Shruti Rajagopalan. The India Forum is excellent—if a bit nerdy—on North-South migration. Our two-part series offers an excellent guide to how the Centre distributes money—and why South India is unhappy.
