If the government keeps its promise, it will conduct a greatly postponed national census this year. It will be followed by a delimitation exercise—which will reapportion parliamentary seats based on population—and trigger a North vs South war not seen since the early days of independence. In this two-part story, we lay out the looming tryst with our demographic destiny—which will transform our nation, one way or another.
Editor’s note: We cannot violate the ‘one person, one vote’ principle. But we can’t punish Indians who have worked for decades toward their prosperity. When the numbers simply don’t add up—to what is a democracy to do? In part two, we look at possible solutions—including the role of migration.
First: The census/delimitation connection
Democracies are built on the bedrock principle of representation. Hence, the Constitution assigns seats based on population numbers.
The total: Article 81 caps the number of Lok Sabha seats at 550—of which no more than 20 can be assigned to smaller union territories. Today, we have 543 seats—of which UTs have 13.
The ratio: The article also requires that the ratio of the number of citizens represented by each seat be roughly equal “so far as practicable”. But to ensure that the smallest states are not left out, those with populations lower than six million are assured at least one seat.
The census: Since the population of a state is critical to determining its share of Lok Sabha seats, the numbers are supposed to be allocated on the basis of the most recent census. After each census, the government is supposed to undertake a ‘delimitation’ exercise—where the number and share of seats are readjusted to reflect changes in the population.
Next: Our lopsided population numbers
India’s current population is an estimated 1.3 billion. We don’t know for sure because we have not held a national census for a while. Conducted every five years, it was to be held in 2021—when it was delayed by the pandemic. And the government has been dragging its feet ever since. The reason: an ulcer-inducing demographic gap between South and North India.
The big picture: We are the most populous country in the world—and likely to remain so until at least 2100. That said, our growth rate has been falling since 1980s—and is now below the global rate—as you can see in the Data for India chart below:
About that fertility rate: The slowdown has not been uniform since the 1970s—due to greater investments in education and healthcare in the South. This resulted in higher female literacy, workforce participation of women—which led to lower population growth rather than family planning campaigns.
This in turn brings us to Total Fertility Rate:
The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is the average number of children that a woman is likely to have in her lifetime… When a country's TFR drops to 2.1, meaning that women will have an average of 2.1 children over their lifetimes, demographers say that the country has reached 'replacement fertility'. What this means is that if two adults have a notional 2.1 children between them, then.. that couple will produce two adults, and the size of the population will remain the same. This is a key milestone in a country's demographic journey. If fertility falls below that level, the population will begin to decline in absolute numbers.
India’s TFR is now 2.0—below replacement level—and lower than the global rate of 2.31. In fact, the absolute number of children born in India has been dropping since the 2000s. And our population growth will turn negative in the 2060s.
But, but, but: That number hides a tricky disparity. Today, 31 states and UTs have hit the replacement fertility rate of 2.1. Only five states: Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Meghalaya, and Manipur are higher. Bihar is at pole position with 3.02—way ahead of Uttar Pradesh at 2.38 and Jharkhand at 2.31. OTOH, the TFR of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka is 1.5 or less—lower than the United Kingdom, US and France.
A rural/urban divide: There are vast differences within states, as well:
The birth numbers in rural Bihar look like nothing in any other part of the country. For instance, in one district, Kishanganj, the fertility rate hovers around 4.8 or 4.9. Cash incentives for sterilisation and free birth control tablets have failed to make the slightest impact.
OTOH, the TFR for a city like Calcutta is only 1. The pattern is consistent across states, according to experts: “In a highly urban area like Jaipur, you have low fertility rates. But if you go to Tonk or the interiors, you will find that fertility rates are higher, especially in backward regions.”
The main takeaway: Regional variations apart, the larger divide is indeed along the Vindhyas. And it is stark:
Between the 1971 and 2011 censuses, the combined population of Rajasthan, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat in the North grew by over 150%. In contrast, the southern states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Karnataka saw growth below 100% during the same period.
That gap will become smaller—but only in the 2030s–as you can see below:
Population numbers = Delimitation numbers
This is where the ‘one person, one vote’ principle becomes tricky—as a yardstick of representation. If population is the sole criteria for assigning parliamentary seats, South India faces the peril of political irrelevance—at least on the national stage.
Where we were yesterday: Until 1976, the Indian government dutifully followed the Constitution’s mandates to the tee—jiggering seats every 10 years to match changes in population. In 1976, the Indira Gandhi government pushed through the highly controversial 42nd Amendment to the Constitution—primarily to protect her political base in the South.
In essence, the amendment said that any future delimitation exercise must be based on the 1971 census—until 2000. At the time, India’s population was 548 million (54.8 crore) with a registered electorate of 274 million (27.4 crore). In 2000, the ruling BJP party—unwilling to piss off its Southern NDA partners—kicked the can down the road to 2026… and so here we are.
Where we are today: Taken together, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh and Pondicherry have 130 out of 543 seats. The ratio of representation is vastly unfair to North Indians:
At the extremes: In Bihar, one Member of Parliament (MP) represents approximately 3.1 million citizens. An Uttar Pradesh MP represents approximately 2.96 million citizens. A Tamil Nadu MP represents approximately 1.97 million citizens. And a Kerala MP represents approximately 1.75 million citizens.
Or to put it differently:
Today, the asymmetry in seat share for states looks much worse than it did in 2001. Tamil Nadu has nine seats more and Kerala has six seats more than their population proportion. While Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, respectively, have nine seats and twelve seats less than their population proportion.
Point to note: This North-South divide also mirrors other demographic gaps. For example, poorer parts of the country also have higher fertility rates—and are therefore underrepresented. Unsurprisingly, the same holds true for Dalits and backward castes. States with higher fertility rates also have more young people—who again get the short end of the representation yardstick.
Where we may be tomorrow: If the census kicks off early in 2025, the population data will likely be declared by 2026. According to government sources, delimitation will be completed in 2028—in time for the 2029 election. If we then redistribute the current number of Lok Sabha seats based on these new numbers, the effect will be radical:
Taken together, the five southern states will lose as many as 24 seats, a loss of nearly one-fifth of the total number of seats they now have. Kerala is at the risk of losing about one third of the Lok Sabha seats it has. On the other hand, four Hindi heartland states together – UP, Bihar, Rajasthan, and MP – will add a whopping 34 seats to their kitty.
And that is why Southern CMs like MK Stalin and Chandrababu Naidu are anxious about fertility rates—making cracks about couples producing 16 children.
The bottomline: We cannot violate the ‘one person, one vote’ principle. But we can’t punish Indians who have worked for decades toward their prosperity. When the numbers simply don’t add up—to what is a democracy to do? We look at possible solutions—including the role of migration—in part two.
Reading list
The Telegraph has a good overview of South India’s “panic” over delimitation. Data For India is best on big picture population numbers for India. Shruti Rajagopalan offers a detailed and nerdy analysis of the demographic dilemma. Milan Vaishnav and Jamie Hintson crunched key data to lay out the north-south gap in representation. I If you want even more numbers, we recommend Mohammed Sanjir Ahmad’s piece for The India Forum. We also did a more detailed Big Story focusing on delimitation numbers.
