Irrespective of what happens in Syria, the startling fall of President Bashar al-Assad comes at a climactic moment for the Middle East. The two nations most damaged by this unexpected event: Iran and Russia. The two opportunists hoping to profit from their misery: Israel and the United States. The true dark horse and clear winner: Turkey.
This is part two of our Big Story series on the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In part one, we explained the fall of Assad—and the rise of the near-unknown Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and its former/present jihadist leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani.
Iran: A year of unfortunate events
Since the October 7 attacks, Tehran has been in free fall—as each of its allies have been targeted—and nearly decimated. First came the Israeli offensive on Hamas in Gaza—followed by Hezbollah in Lebanon. Now, it has lost its only real military ally—Syria—which was the lynchpin of Tehran’s geopolitical strategy:
For decades, Iran has expended much blood and money in support of Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, helping him survive a civil war that threatened his dynastic rule. Iran operated military bases, weapons warehouses and missile factories in Syria, which it used as a pipeline for arming its militant allies across the region.
And yet Iran has beaten a retreat—with unseemly and inexplicable speed. An internal Iranian military memo says it is as if “Iran accepted the fall of Assad and has lost the will to resist.”
Joy to America? A number of US pundits have rejoiced at Iran’s misfortune—claiming victory for US/Israel:
A collapse of Iran’s partnership with Syria would by all accounts reshape the balance of power in the Middle East. The “axis of resistance” that Iran has formed with its militant allies in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Syria, Iraq and Yemen would be weakened. Israel and its Arab allies would be strengthened.
This is exactly what Washington has been doing its best to achieve—since Donald Trump brokered the so-called Abraham Accords in 2020. The goal: make peace between Israel and the Arab states—especially Saudi Arabia—to isolate and defang Iran. In this context, the fall of Assad seems like a windfall.
But, but, but: Those ‘Arab allies’ will hardly be thrilled with a jihadist government on their doorstep. Neither is Tel Aviv all that happy to lose a familiar enemy to HTS:
In recent years, Israel has preferred “the devil we know” in Assad, over instability and insecurity created by the Islamist rebel groups, said Eyal Zisser, who follows Syria at Tel Aviv University… that rebel group’s blend of nationalism and Islamism, which echoes the ideology of Afghanistan’s Taliban and Palestinian Hamas, is regarded by Israel as a dangerous threat, particularly were it to come to power in neighboring Syria.
In other words: Assad may yet prove to be the proverbial frying pan—to the HTS fire.
The Israel factor: Assad’s support for Hezbollah was at best luke-warm. No one knows how his successor—former Al Qaeda loyalist Abu Mohammed al-Jolani—will view Israel or the situation in Gaza. But Tel Aviv is certainly not helping matters. The IDF has rushed to seize territory in Golan Heights—supposedly to create a ‘buffer zone’. And it has carried out more than 100 air strikes across the country. The justification for this: “Israel says it is acting to stop weapons falling into the hands of extremists."
Quote to note: Israeli Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi described Syria as a fourth “fighting front”—along with Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon.
Russia: A massive power cut
Hmeimim hosts one of Russia’s largest military bases outside the former Soviet Union—and Tartus is a highly valued naval port. Syria is also core to Vladimir Putin’s goal to challenge the United States’ status as the singular superpower in the region:
A fast-advancing rebel offensive in Syria threatens to dislodge Russia from a strategic linchpin that Moscow has used for a decade to project power in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean and into the African continent… Syria has partly been an ideological project for Putin. The intervention in Syria became a way for Russia to extend its vision of a multipolar world opposed to the Western liberal order, said [Russia expert] Nicole Grajewski.
A Saigon Moment? Moscow is now in great danger of recreating the embarrassing US pullout of Vietnam back in 1973:
To see Russian planes leave Syria as rebel forces move onward towards their air bases, and their assets in Damascus fall, this would be so devastating for the Russian image of itself. It would be akin to a Saigon moment for them.
To avoid such humiliation, Moscow is now scrambling to establish friendly relations with the rebels—whom it dismissed as terrorists just days ago:
“I assume Russia wants to hold bases if they can through negotiations,” said Dara Massicot, a senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Resources they can offer: money, barter, oil and gas, limited mercenaries. What matters is if the Syrian coalition would entertain anything from them.”
The approach appears to be working: the Russian embassy and bases have remained untouched. The greatest danger for the US is that Israel’s bullying will help redeem Moscow in the eyes of the new rulers.
The bigger picture: Now Moscow has lost its foothold in Syria, experts predict it will move even closer to Tehran—which is already supplying military equipment to Russian troops on the Ukraine front. US sanctions against the two nations have also strengthened their mutual dependence. The fall of Syria will only deepen it further.
Quote to note: Some Russia experts say the loss of Syria bodes ill for peace negotiations with Ukraine:
Assad’s collapse has also shaken [President] Putin, making him less inclined to demonstrate flexibility with Ukraine. The war in Ukraine has, to some extent, cost him Syria, which reinforces his unwillingness to compromise.
Turkey: Many birds, one stone
For now, Istanbul is indifferent to the risks of creating “a dangerous power vacuum that will be filled by terrorists.” It is content to have bested Assad—and seemingly ‘solved’ the two problems that matter most: The Kurds and Syrian refugees.
About those Kurds: They are an ethnic minority spread across Turkey, Iraq and Syria—and have long demanded an independent homeland. Ergo, they have been ethnically cleansed for just as long. Turkey shares a 911-kilometer border with Syria—which is also home to Kurds and their militias.
When the US withdrew from Syria in 2018, Ankara crossed the border to establish a ‘buffer zone’. Since that time, Turkish-backed Syrian groups in the region have been accused of war crimes against Kurds in the area. Those same groups are part of the HTS-led alliance retaking Damascus.
About those refugees: Ankara has also been the main backer of groups aiming to topple Assad—and offered safe haven to those who oppose him. As of now, Turkey hosts three million Syrian refugees—which has turned into a political albatross for President Recep Erdogan. Needless to say, Assad has been only too happy to arm Kurdish groups to take on Ankara and its Syrian allies. His downfall spells a death knell for these Kurds—and the speedy return of Syrian refugees. Data point to note: 40% of these refugees are from Aleppo—the first city taken by HTS.
But, but, but: Turkey also doesn’t seem to have any game plan beyond ousting Assad. Ankara-controlled militias are not powerful enough to rule Syria. Turkey is, in essence, betting heavily on an unknown and unpredictable entity:
It remains unclear whether Erdoğan has any real influence over the HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, and whether the recent HTS rebranding was genuine… HTS rebranding away from international jihadism predates the current crisis by as much as eight years, but the organisation remained “politically dictatorial using arbitrary arrest of critics, torture and imprisonment.”
Lost in the shuffle: The Kurds who helped Washington fight the Islamic State. They are still backed by the US but are now under fire from Turkish forces. There is every indication that Washington may sell them out—for advantage over Russia:
In their call Sunday, [the two sides] agreed that coordination was necessary “to prevent further escalation of an already volatile situation, as well as to avoid any risk to US forces and partners,” according to a readout of the conversation released by the Pentagon. The United States also acknowledged Turkey’s “legitimate security concerns.”
FYI: Ankara’s main concern is to rewrite Syria’s map to its advantage, which includes kicking the Kurds off its borders.
The bottomline: Al-Jolani chose to make his first public speech at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. He condemned Syria’s history as “a playground for Iranian ambitions, spreading sectarianism, stirring corruption.” But, but, but, he also said: “This victory, my brothers, is a victory for the entire Islamic nation.” Talk about mixed messages!
Reading list
CNN explains how the wars in Ukraine and Lebanon brought down Assad. BBC News has the latest on Israeli strikes on Syria. The Guardian and PBS look at Russia’s scramble to save face and its bases. Associated Press has a good explainer on Turkey and the Kurds. CNN looks at how Trump—who is close to Putin—may deal with Syria. Also in CNN: A good analysis of Al-Jolani’s first speech. Also read: Our Big Story on the fall of Assad and his most likely successor Abu Muhammad al-Jolani.
