The TLDR: On Friday, the United States withdrew from the Bagram Air Force base—the headquarters of its military operations, and where its forces first arrived after the 9/11 attacks. The quiet departure—without notice or fanfare—also marks the inevitable return of the Taliban, and a decisive tipping point that has everyone worried—especially India. 

Are there American troops still in Afghanistan?

Not that you’d notice, but yes, they have long maintained a small but symbolic presence: 13,000 troops as of last year, when they signed an agreement with the Taliban to fully draw down their military presence. 

An agreement with the Taliban?

The US has been trying to extricate itself from Afghanistan since 2015, when Barack Obama concluded the war was essentially unwinnable. But Americans were still reluctant to deal with the Taliban—which had returned in strength soon after the US pivoted from Afghanistan toward the Iraq war in 2003. That changed with the election of Donald Trump—who appointed a special envoy to negotiate directly with the Taliban, cutting even the Afghan government out of the loop. The result: a peace agreement signed in Doha in 2020 which said the following:

• The Taliban will provide “guarantees” and spell out “enforcement mechanisms” to ensure that Afghanistan is not used by any group working against the “security of the United States and its allies.”
• In turn, the United States will provide guarantees and announce a “timeline for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan.” This includes a schedule to shut down all military bases.
• The Taliban and the Afghan government will swap prisoners, and the US will work toward persuading its allies and the UN to remove members of the Taliban from their sanctions lists.
• The US was supposed to have withdrawn entirely by May—but due to the pandemic, the new deadline is September 11, exactly 20 years after the 9/11 attacks.

Wait, isn’t there an Afghan government?

Kinda. The country held elections last year, and Ashraf Ghani was sworn in as President this year. But the verdict was challenged by his rival Abdullah Abdullah—who held his own swearing in ceremony. In May, the two men signed a power-sharing deal—but that truce is fragile, and the divisions within the leadership run deep. 

More importantly, given all the infighting, the government has failed to craft any kind of strategy to either negotiate with the Taliban—or prevent its return. It instead clung to the US presence for protection—which will no longer be available:

“Officials inside the government, along with those who have left it, describe an atmosphere of improvisation, a bureaucracy caught off guard despite weeks of warning signs — even before the latest advance, the Taliban were slowly picking off districts — and the absence of a coherent plan… ‘There is no response. They don’t have a counteroffensive strategy,’ said Mr. Asey, the former deputy defense minister. ‘Nobody knows what it is.’”

Point to note: Many intelligence experts predict the government will fall within six months. 

So the Taliban is coming back?

A military sweep: Taliban forces have been moving steadily to take over large swathes of the countryside. They now control roughly a third of all 421 districts in Afghanistan. And they have made most of their gains in the northern part—which has been traditionally controlled by US-backed warlords. More worryingly, they have met with very little resistance:

“[A local council member] blamed Taliban successes on the poor morale of troops who are mostly outnumbered and without resupplies. ‘Unfortunately, the majority of the districts were left to Taliban without any fight,’ said Rahman. In the last three days, 10 districts fell to Taliban, eight without a fight, he said. Hundreds of Afghan army, police and intelligence troops surrendered their military outposts and fled…”

A ‘government-in-waiting’: That’s how the Taliban see themselves, as this BBC News ground report reveals:

“They refer to themselves as the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,’ the name they used when in power from 1996 until being overthrown in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Now, they have a sophisticated ‘shadow’ structure, with officials in charge of overseeing everyday services in the areas they control.”

Back to the future? Taliban leaders are very clear about their goal: “We want an Islamic government ruled by the Sharia. We will continue our jihad until they accept our demands." And while they have been coy about spelling out exactly what that means, their behaviour in districts they control speaks volumes:

“One local resident… described villagers being slapped or beaten for shaving their beards, or having stereos smashed for listening to music. ‘People have no choice but to do what they say… even over minor issues they get physical. People are scared.’"

Even more telling is this quote from a ‘mayor’ of one of these districts: 

"The Taliban before and the Taliban now are the same. So comparing that time and now - nothing has changed… But, there are changes in personnel of course. Some people are harsher and some are calmer. That's normal."

Point to note: With the government missing in action, many ethnic and regional factions are organising themselves into citizen militias. They may offer greater resistance to the Taliban—but the fragmentation also threatens a collapse into an all-out civil war, which is what brought the Taliban to power the last time around.

Ok, but why is this a worry for India?

Director of Carnegie India Rudra Chaudhuri outlines three key dangers posed by a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan:

One: One of the most militarily powerful factions within the Taliban is led by Sirajuddin Haqqani—who is closely allied with Pakistan’s intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI):

“The Haqqani group, which continues to be the best armed and trained Taliban faction, has engineered and carried out attacks against Indian assets, including the Indian embassy in Kabul. ‘The US media,’ argues [South Asia expert] Myra Macdonald, ‘reported that Washington believed the ISI had provided support for the attack.’ Given the close connections between the ISI and the Haqqani leadership, it is highly likely that a reconciled Haqqani group will continue with its anti-India agenda.”

Point to note: The peace agreement with the US did not include any assurances about India.

Two: The ISI is betting big on its cosy relationship with the Taliban—despite what Imran Khan may claim in public, or our recent overtures to the Taliban. And with the Taliban in power, Islamabad’s aim will be to keep India firmly on the outside:

“The nexus between the Taliban (especially the Haqqani group) and the ISI underscores Pakistan’s increasing influence within the country. The Taliban leadership may not always see eye to eye with the Pakistani state and the ISI, but the ISI’s influence over the Taliban is undeniable. ‘They are our powerful watchmen’ is how one former founding member of the Taliban summarized his relationship with the ISI. Given the potential of Taliban representation in Kabul in the near future, this state of affairs is naturally far from comfortable for India.”

And the US—which leaned on Islamabad to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table—is also relying on the Pakistanis to keep them in line after it departs. So Afghanistan also gives Imran Khan some leverage in his relationship with Washington. 

Point to note: Of course, many experts point out that the Taliban has often behaved like Frankenstein’s monster—biting the very hand that nurtured them. The last time they were in power in Kabul, Islamic militancy spread across the border, inspiring bloody terrorist attacks by its Pakistani branch, Tehreek-e-Taliban. So the costs may well outweigh the benefits in the long run.

Three: ISIS is alive and well in Afghanistan—and its branch Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) is on the rise:

“This group’s ability to attract radicalized individuals, including from India, and recruit well-trained defectors from Taliban and Pakistani militant groups is a very real threat to India’s future in Afghanistan and the region more broadly. An attack on a gurdwara in Kabul, in March 2020—for which the IS-K claimed responsibility—is the most telling example of the very real security risks to India’s footprint inside Afghanistan. That one of the four IS-K operatives who stormed the gurdwara complex was from Kerala… makes this threat all the more pressing for Indian officials.”

Four: Kashmir. ISI has long used Afghanistan as a hosting ground for Islamic militant groups that target India. 

Point to note: India has invested $3 billion in Afghanistan since 2002—and the US presence was key to expanding its footprint in the nation, and countering Pakistan’s influence. 

The bottomline: Whatever the consequences for India, they pale in comparison with what awaits the Afghan people (especially women). The passport office in Kabul is packed with citizens trying to flee the country. A shopkeeper tells the New York Times, “There’s no hope for the future… I don’t know whether I am going to be safe 10 minutes from now.”

Reading list

• The Hindu has an excellent explainer on the history of US involvement in Afghanistan—and why its departure matters. 
• Indian Express traces the history of Bagram Air Force base—and its symbolic and military value.
• BBC News has a brilliant and chilling ground report from Taliban-held Afghanistan. 
• New York Times has two good stories: One on the abysmal failure of the Afghan government, and the other on the blowback Pakistan will face for putting all its eggs in the Taliban basket. 
• Brookings has an excellent piece on Imran Khan’s convenient narrative about the Taliban.
• We also did an explainer on why domestic extremism is a serious challenge to Pakistan’s stability.
• Rudra Chaudhuri’s long piece in Carnegie India looks at the stake for New Delhi—and outlines a possible strategy.
• Ayesha Siddiqa in The Print takes a sceptical view of India’s efforts to reach out to the Taliban.