The TLDR: The nation has been convulsed by violent clashes, which have shaken an already weak government. Its confrontation with the radical group Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan—on a violent crusade against blasphemy—reveals how Islamic extremism has been a double-edged sword for the rulers of Pakistan—often endangering those who seek to wield it.

What is Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan?

What you need to know: In 2016, a Sunni cleric Khadim Hussain Rizvi founded an Islamic rightwing group called Tehreek-e-Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYRA). In 2017, it became a political party, renaming itself Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). We’ve included a long timeline of its antics over the years below. But here’s the gist of it: The TLP sees itself as the guardian of Hurmat-e-Rasool (Prophet Muhammad’s honour).  Blasphemy is a big thing for TLP. The party repeatedly launches violent demonstrations against those who have dishonoured Islam or the Prophet. And each time, the government and the Pakistani military use a mix of force and appeasement to deal with them. For example, this infamous video of a senior Army officer distributing money to TLP protesters in 2017:

The timeline:

• In 2009, Aasia Bibi, a Christian woman, was accused of insulting the Prophet during a quarrel with her neighbours. She was arrested and sentenced to death in 2010. 
• Salman Taseer, then governor of Punjab, spoke out in her support, and against the nation’s blasphemy laws.
• He was soon after assassinated by his own bodyguard Mumtaz Qadri—who too was sentenced to death in 2016. TLYRA first became visible when it rallied around Qadri, and Rizvi publicly wept after his execution. 
• In 2017, its successor TLP forced the resignation of the law minister who dared to change the holy oath taken by members of parliament. 
• In 2018—when Aasia Bibi was acquitted of blasphemy charges—its leaders declared it was justifiable to kill those who overturned her guilty verdict. The Imran Khan government buckled and agreed to bar her from leaving the country until the ruling could be appealed.
• In 2020, the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo republished the controversial cartoons of Prophet Muhammad that triggered a mass killing of its staff members in 2015. 
• Months later, a Pakistani man—inspired by TLP leader Rizvi’s videos raging against the cartoons—stabbed two people in Paris.
• Soon after, a school teacher was beheaded because he showed Charlie Hebdo cartoons lampooning Prophet Muhammad in class (we explained this here). 
• When President Emmanuel Macron vowed to resist Islamic extremism, TLP launched a nationwide protest—demanding the government cut all ties with France.
• In November and in the middle of the protests, Rizvi Sr died likely of Covid-related complications and was replaced by Rizvi Jr, his 26-year-old son, Saad Hussain Rizvi. Its activities have reportedly taken “a more militant turn” ever since.

Big allure of blasphemy

Pakistan’s blasphemy laws are an emotional lightning rod in an increasingly conservative society. And even the most minor offences are punished with ferocity, as Al Jazeera notes:

“In the last decade, the ‘offences’ committed by those accused of blasphemy have been as absurd as throwing a business card into the rubbish (the man’s name was Muhammad), a rural water dispute, spelling errors, the naming of a child, the design of a place of worship, burning a (non-religious) talisman or sharing a picture on Facebook. Increasingly, cases are being settled with violence outside the courtroom, with mob and targeted attacks against those accused.”

A political super-weapon: TLP is obsessed with blasphemy because it is also a source of great political power in a nation that was formed as a homeland for Muslims. As one expert explains:

“Religious identity has been centred as one of the core bases for national belonging in Pakistan. When the state has defined Islam as the ultimate source of sovereignty, such battles have taken on deeper political significance… What is important in Pakistan is the jostling for position as the true, authentic and passionate representatives of Islam, that has given blasphemy accusations its real force in political life.”

A complicit government

The Imran Khan government has responded to the crisis with its tried-and-tested pander-and-punish strategy. 

The punishment: This week, TLP revived its November demand for a total boycott of France—claiming that the government had reneged on its promise to put the plan in front of the Parliament. The protests quickly turned into violent confrontations involving tear gas and rubber bullets—and several soldiers and policemen were killed or injured. The scenes looked something like this:

Imran Khan moved quickly to first arrest Saad Rizvi—and then ban TLP as a terrorist organisation. Of course, experts say the ban will do little to diminish the party or the appeal of its ideology. And the government is back to negotiating with the TLP after it abducted 11 policemen—who have been handed back.

The pandering: Even as he was busy condemning the TLP, Khan was trying to wrest the mantle of protector from them. In a televised address, he unveiled a plan to lead a group of 50 Muslim countries in a global campaign to criminalise any insult to the Prophet: 

“When 50 Muslim countries will unite and say this, and say that if something like this happens in any country, then we will launch a trade boycott on them and not buy their goods, that will have an effect.”

And his main criticism of TLP’s demand for boycott is not that it is wrong, but merely ineffective: 

“My question is: by sending the French ambassador back and cutting all ties, will this stop? Is there a guarantee that people will stop insulting the prophet? I guarantee that if we do this, if Pakistan does this, then this same thing will happen in another European country on the issue of freedom of expression.”

Point to note: The line between Khan and Rizvi is thin, as a very perceptive Zaigham Khan lays out:

“If there is one party it resembles the most, it is the PTI [Khan's party]. In a way, the TLP is the PTI of the poor. Like the PTI, it is a populist party that gives vent to the anger and frustrations of its followers; this anger is based in rapid social change and globalisation. The TLP provides solace by invoking the appeal of tradition and religion while using modern technology to propagate its message… However, unlike the PTI that mobilised the middle class, the TLP has mobilised the religiously inclined working classes.”

The bottomline: The party may have been banned, and its leader in jail. And these protests may recede for now. But its ideology of political extremism has scored yet another big win: 

“The aim of blasphemy politics is ultimately about defining yourself as the authentic representative of Islam in the public sphere… which in turn forces the Pakistani state, which defines its own sovereignty in relationship to Islam, to yield to this power.”

And yield it will, over and again, in the absence of any serious effort to revive the nation’s battered secular tradition.

Reading list

Al Jazeera’s explainer on Pakistan’s blasphemy laws is an absolute must-read. The Conversation and Samaa have the best pieces on TLP’s rise to power—while Deutsche Welle looks at why it has succeeded. Indian Express offers a solid profile of Khadim Hussain Rizvi, while News International has more on his son, Saad Rizvi. For a scathing assessment of the Pakistan government, read Tara Kartha in The Print. Also in The Print: Hussain Haqqani on why the TLP ban is a farce. New York Times offers a wider view looking at the resurgence of the Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan—which threatens to re-energise extremist forces within Pakistan.