Let’s start with the village

On the face of it, it doesn’t seem like much. The Pentagon report confirms the construction of a 100-home village on territory that is disputed by Tibet and India—which claims it as part of Arunachal Pradesh. But these “model villages” house both civilians and military forces—and are part of growing militarisation along the Northeastern border.

Point to note: Back in January, NDTV released satellite images showing another such village—located 4.5 km within the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). It isn’t clear if this is the same village mentioned in the Pentagon report.

Part of a bigger pattern: The number of land and air incursions over the Arunachal border have increased—accompanied by a big buildup of military forces, the highest since the 1962 war with China. Add to this the inauguration of a high-speed train from Lhasa to the border—and a strategic tunnel—all of which have halved the time it takes to move troops to the Indian border.

A village today, a state tomorrow?

The McMahon Line: The border between Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet was set by the British in 1914—soon after the latter declared its independence from China. But ever since China took over Tibet, Beijing refuses to accept any border agreement signed by Lhasa—and this has included seizing Aksai Chin which India considers as part of Ladakh.

Call it ‘South Tibet’: Initially, China only claimed Tawang—a part of Arunachal Pradesh which was once administered by Lhasa. But for the past two decades, it has staked its claim over the entirety of the state—which it refers to as “South Tibet.” And recent versions of government-issued maps mark it as Chinese territory. Here’s what Arunachal’s border looks like—with Tibet up north and Myanmar to the east:

A history of incursions: Here’s a quick timeline of how fraught the border has been:

• Since the 1962 war, there have been two serious confrontations between India and China on this border. One, in 1975 when four soldiers of the Assam Rifles were killed by a patrolling party of the PLA deep inside Tawang. 
• Another was in 1986, when an Indian patrol found permanent Chinese structures in Tawang—including a helipad. 
• In recent years, the Chinese have opened a new front on the Myanmar side—where they have been constructing roads and deploying troops.
• BJP MLA Tapir Gao claimed last year that Chinese troops are regularly patrolling parts of the state—and earlier this year, he insisted that they have been constructing villages for decades.
• The reality is that Beijing has been incrementally taking bits of territory all along the border—especially sparsely populated parts that are hard to monitor. And no one knows exactly how much has been seized.

The ‘salami slicing’ strategy: That’s what experts call China’s strategy—which consists of shaving off tiny bits of territory to slowly build a powerful military advantage. But none of these actions are in themselves sufficient reason to go to war. So building that 100-house village may not seem like much—but it is part of a far bigger play: 

• One: “They change the status of an area which was previously uninhabited to inhabited. with people either from Tibet or mainland China. So they change the demography in a disputed area.”
• Two: The “village-building spree coupled with a major buildup of new military installations… is a difficult strategy to counter as it does not involve armed aggression. What it is doing is using villagers and herders at the vanguard and they are backed by regular army troops.”

The other Chinese dagger: Chumbi Valley

While China nibbles away at Arunachal, it is also executing a parallel strategy in a part of Tibet called Chumbi Valley—which is very close to the India border. Much like real estate, military strategy is about location, location, location. So let’s start with where the valley is located in Tibet:

As you can see, the valley is very close to the Siliguri corridor—also referred to as the “chicken’s neck.” It is the relatively skinny strip that connects the Northeastern states to the rest of India. At the narrowest bit, it is only 17 km wide. Naturally, anything that endangers control of that strip is disastrous for India.

The Bhutan problem: You can also see that Bhutan acts like a buffer between Chumbi Valley and the Siliguri corridor. But that buffer has been eroding over many years:

• The entire Bhutan-China border has been disputed for decades—with China claiming huge swathes of the country as its own.
• The Chinese have especially been pushing for territorial gains in the Doklam plateau—which is right in that buffer area, and for two reasons. One: It extends the tip of the Chumbi Valley “dagger” pointed at that “chicken’s neck.” Two: the plateau offers a perfect strategic view of the entire Siliguri corridor.
• These encroachments—which included the construction of a road in Bhutanese territory—led to a big face-off between India and China in 2017.
• The two sides reached a settlement—which proved to be empty. Beijing went right back to business soon after.
• It simply altered the route to the plateau and began a massive military build-up—including accommodations for troops and helipads. China also began building a model village and a road snaking south towards India, all in Bhutanese territory. 
• Through it all, both Bhutan and India have remained silent.
• This October, Bhutan and China signed a memorandum of understanding to settle their border disputes—and ORF Online describes it as window dressing that seals Beijing’s existing control over Bhutanese territory.

Point to note: China has recently been on a recruiting spree in Chumbi Valley—aimed at inducting at least one Tibetan per household into the Chinese military. 

Quote to note: Commenting on the China-Tibet agreement, an intelligence expert says:

“Maintaining control of the Chumbi Valley and gaining control over Doklam gives China a tactical advantage over India in a potential conflict. Beijing would then have a significant advantage where it can outflank Indian defensive entrenchments in Sikkim, as well as being able to cut off the Siliguri corridor. India would not only lose the ability to mount a strategic counter-offensive, but also grant the Chinese a launch pad for offensives into Kalimpong [in West Bengal].”

The bottomline: The government has not said very much about either intrusions into Arunachal Pradesh or developments in Bhutan—other than the usual bickering with Congress. A top general would only say that the military is looking at a “whole of the nation approach” to “mitigate this threat in normal times, the hybrid threat as and when it manifests as also during conflict conditions.” Make of that what you will.

Reading list

• You can read the Pentagon report here. 
• Economic Times has more on the rising Chinese presence on the borders, while this Print piece looks at the Chinese village in Indian-claimed territory revealed earlier this year. 
• This 2017 NewsLaundry piece penned by Lt General Panag is very good at explaining why Chumbi Valley matters.
• The Citizen offers a historical overview of Chinese claims over Arunachal Pradesh—while The Quint takes a detailed look at the territory being lost to China.
• Times of India lists the reasons why the state matters to Beijing.
• ORF and TRT Online explain why India should be worried about Bhutan’s border deal with China.
• This older War on Rocks piece offers context on the Doklam plateau crisis—and looks at why India was unable to contain China.