On Saturday, Iran launched over 300 rockets at Israel—in retaliation to Israel’s strike on the Iranian consulate in Syria. Both acts crossed critical red lines that have helped avoid war in the Middle East. Will this spiral of vengeance result in an uncontrollable war? If so, who benefits?
First, some quick background
We’re not going to wade into the long and complicated history of the Middle East. But here’s what you need to know to understand where we are and why. (Laid out in far greater detail in this Big Story and our YouTube explainer)
The ‘new’ Middle East: The roots of the current tinder keg—including the war on Gaza—lie in a grand vision to remake the region. Back in the summer of 2023, the US, Israel and the powerful Arab states were cooking up a grand plan to get rid of the old Middle East—where Arabs hated Israel and were big champions for a free Palestine. Where Shias and Sunnis were sworn enemies.
The reason: Arab states are far more afraid of Iran—than invested in the cause of Palestine. An alliance with Israel keeps Tehran in check—and the US firmly by their side.
Israel aur Arabs ki jodi: To weaken and isolate Iran—and strengthen Israel—the US brokered what are called the Abraham accords starting in 2020. These were ground-breaking deals that normalised relations between Israel and UAE—followed by Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. What’s significant about these accords is that the Arabs did not make a Palestine state a condition for peace.
In the summer of 2023, the Saudis were getting ready to sign a deal with Israel in exchange for a defence pact with the US. That would be the final piece that would isolate Iran and make Palestine/Hamas irrelevant. The rest is blood-soaked history.
The big Israel vs Iran face-off: The Middle East today is divided in a totally different way. On one side is Iran—which has a small but significant alliance. You can see them in green. There's Qatar and Syria and key militias like Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen. Not much… but powerful enough to be a thorn in the side for the US and Israel.
And as you can see, there’s far more blue representing the other side—all of Tel Aviv’s new Arab wannabe pals—plus its old ones, Egypt and Jordan, UAE… And the biggest fat cat of ‘em all, Saudi Arabia.
Where we are now: Thanks to the Gaza war, Iran and its allies (Hezbollah, Houthis etc) have emerged as the most ardent protectors of Palestine. That puts the Arab states in an awkward position—to say the least. They can’t be seen as openly ganging up with Israel against Iran.
Israel alone: Tel Aviv is in danger of becoming entirely isolated—thanks to Benjamin Netanyahu’s lack of any restraint. Even those on Israel’s side point to how much has been lost in the last six months:
Today, after a bloody attack that might have brought it the world’s sympathy, Israel is closer to being a global pariah than ever before. Its Saudi peace deal is on hold. The Palestinian question is again roiling its Arab neighbors. It is in open argument with its main ally, the US.
That’s where we were on April 1—when Israel launched missile strikes on the Iran consulate in Syria…
The first red line: The consulate strike
On April 1, Israeli missiles levelled the Iran consulate in Damascus—targeting two senior military leaders and five officers who were in the building at the time. The big prize: The assassination of a top commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)—Mohammad Reza Zahedi—and his deputies. He was in charge of coordinating the actions of Iran’s allied militias—Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis. While Israel has not directly claimed credit, its officials privately say Tel Aviv could not pass up this priceless opportunity.
Why this mattered: Israel has struck Iran’s military installations in Syria in the past—but targeting the embassy was a gross violation of international norms. It was also a highly provocative action in the midst of growing international outrage over the devastation of Gaza. And it clearly risked broadening the war in Gaza—to a direct conflict between Iran and Israel—a possibility that most worried the Pentagon:
Senior leaders at the Pentagon also have privately expressed frustration at the timing of the Damascus strike, according to the senior defence official, because it had the potential to be “catastrophically escalatory.”
Biden’s secret worry: was that the Israeli action was aimed at achieving exactly that—a broader war that dragged in the US. White House officials politely described Tel Aviv’s “frenetic” approach to military operations: “There’s this urgency to act, and that’s what happened in Damascus.”
The second red line: A downpour of missiles
Everyone knew that Iran was going to retaliate. Tehran openly said so—and the top US commander was already in Israel to help its military prepare. Washington was also frantically signalling its “ironclad” commitment to Israel’s defence—hoping it would force Iran to back down, fearing consequences. It did not work.
Iran strikes back: On late Saturday, Iran launched an estimated 300 drones and cruise missiles towards Israel. According to the IDF, the Israeli and US military intercepted and destroyed 99% of them—with an assist from allies such as Britain and also Jordan. The only casualty was a severely injured child. The attacks were launched from four separate sites: Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.
Why this mattered: This is the first time Iran has directly attacked Israel. Until now, the two had been content to fight by proxy:
A so-called shadow war between Israel and Iran has shaped the Middle East for decades. Of the many conflicts that have roiled the region, theirs has long been among the most explosive. The two have attacked each other—mostly quietly and in Iran’s case often by proxy—while avoiding an escalation into direct war.
This is an unprecedented escalation. If old rules don’t apply, then there is no predicting how Israel will react.
Why this happened: Most analysts—including those in the West—say Tel Aviv left Tehran with little choice. It had to do something—or risk losing face—both at home and in the region:
Though the Islamic Republic can ill afford an all-out regional war “they were compelled to do this… The Iranians concluded that the risk of not responding outweighed the risk of responding.”
But, but, but: Iran seemed to take great pains to pull its punches—and make sure everyone knew it. Earlier this month, Chatham House noted:
Iran is also signalling, through interviews given by officials and through backchannels, that the retaliation will be limited and aimed at deterrence to avoid triggering a direct conflict with Israel.
And when it was time to attack—after two weeks of noisy sabre-rattling—it chose slow-moving drones to give US, Israel and others time to prepare a defence:
Iran also appeared to telegraph the attack on Israel long in advance, giving the Israelis and their allies plenty of time to prepare their air defences, a move that some regional experts and U.S. officials interpreted as a calculated effort to reduce the risk of further escalation. In the hours before the strikes, both Jordan and Israel shut down their airspace to commercial traffic, while U.S. tankers refuelled U.S. fighter jets lining the skies over Iraq. “It does seem like it was telegraphed,” Mulroy said. “Perhaps to allow them to be shot down.”
As a result—by Israel’s own account—the damage was minimal.
The big Q: What will Israel do?
Soon after the attack, Iran hastily declared that it "deemed the matter concluded"—signalling its desire to end the cycle of tit-for-tat. Perhaps it expects the minimal damage will persuade Israel to call it a win—and do the same. It may be mistaken. Experts are split on what they expect to happen next.
Israel will not retaliate: Reports of the conversations between Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant and his US counterpart Lloyd Austin are encouraging. He “emphasised” Israel’s readiness to defend itself—and “made no mention of Israel striking back.” An Israeli official also told the New York Times that “Israel’s response would be coordinated with its allies.”
A lack of American enthusiasm: The optimistic school of thought relies heavily on the ability of the US to discourage Tel Aviv—which it has done with little success thus far. Washington’s biggest worry right now is Tel Aviv not Tehran—lurking underneath the loud declarations of sympathy and support:
There is concern among top U.S. officials that Israel could quickly respond to Iran’s attacks without thinking through the potential fallout, according to a senior administration official and a senior defence official.
The Iranian attack could give Netanyahu and his rightwing allies the excuse—and political oxygen—they need:
Both Biden and the Iranians are well aware that Netanyahu would ideally like to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities, which he has long seen as an existential threat to Israel. Reducing them to rubble would be very hard without US help, but it is possible that he and other Israeli hawks could try to seize this opportunity to deliver that ambition… Administration officials are well aware that Netanyahu has an incentive to keep hostilities going, as it fends off the collapse of his coalition and new elections.
Reminder: Netanyahu is presently besieged by massive protests calling for his resignation—and immediate elections.
A very measured support: These worries are writ large in Biden’s response to the Iranian attack.
- He dutifully noted that damage had been minimal—and “nearly all of the incoming drones and missiles” had been brought down.
- He said this in itself sent “a clear message to its foes that they cannot effectively threaten the security of Israel.” The subtext: So you don’t need to bomb them right back to make that point.
- Biden also made clear that America’s military resources would be aimed at “protecting” US troops in the region—and “support” Israel’s defence.
- Most bluntly this: “A top U.S. official said the U.S. had informed Israel it does not plan on striking Iran itself.”
How many ways can you find to say the same thing?
But, but, but: This is an election year—and Biden is under tremendous pressure to make the right political moves. Right before the Iranian attack, he took the unprecedented step of tying future aid to Israel to the civilian casualty count in Gaza—to make the left wing of his party happy.
But thanks to Tehran, he just lost the power to wave that stick:
The attack has for now distracted global attention from Israel’s conduct of the war in Gaza. Furthermore, the Iranian attack is also likely to dispel murmurs in the US Congress about curbing weapons supplies to Israel because of Gaza. Now such restrictions can be cast by Israel’s supporters as leaving America’s leading ally in the Middle East defenceless in the face of the proven Iranian threat.
Both Democrats and Republicans in Congress are rushing to approve military packages—“to ensure that our Israeli allies have everything they need to defend themselves from attacks by Iran and its proxies.”
But, but, but: All this enthusiasm may not extend to putting boots on the ground—or may wither away if Americans come out strongly against US involvement. In a poll conducted just after Hamas’s attack, 84% of Americans were primarily worried the US would be drawn into military involvement in the Middle East.
America the enabler? Washington is torn between its desire to unconditionally support Israel—and prevent a wider war that will risk its troops. It refused to rebuke Tel Aviv for the consulate strike—and instead declared it will defend Israel from any Iranian retaliation.
Some analysts point out: “This completely deprives Israel of any incentives to de-escalate.” They say this constant avowal of “unconditional support” has helped “shape Israel’s strategy that knew no limits, that did not care about international law—because they had come to understand that Biden will support them no matter what.”
The bottomline: This perilous situation is the outcome of domestic pressures on three leaders. Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei can’t afford to look weak when he is crushing a rising tide of popular discontent. Netanyahu needs a neverending war to stay in power—and bombing Iran will help change the subject both at home and abroad. As for Biden, he is in grave danger of losing to Trump—it can’t get any worse than that.
