Researched by: Sara Varghese

A very brief background

Why Ukraine: Ukraine used to be part of the Soviet Union—but broke free in 1991, in the same month that the Soviet Union collapsed. Ever since Vladimir Putin came to power, he has emphasised restoring Russia’s lost glory and power—especially its control over the second largest of its 15 Soviet republics. In the Russian psyche, Ukraine is an extension of itself—and views its capital Kyiv as the birthplace of their nation.

Point to note: Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 and annexed the region of Crimea. So this isn’t exactly unprecedented.

Putin’s demands: Russia sees its former republics as its territory—especially Belarus and Ukraine. NATO has to recognise “a Russian sphere of interest in Eastern Europe” and just back off. This means pledging to never make Ukraine a member of NATO. The Russian claim: Kyiv will immediately try and reclaim Crimea if it becomes a part of the alliance. Also this:

“Moscow accuses Nato countries of ‘pumping’ Ukraine with weapons and the US of stoking tensions to contain Russia's development. Mr Putin has complained Russia has ‘nowhere further to retreat to—do they think we'll just sit idly by?’”

The NATO position: In the alliance’s view, Putin is trying to push NATO back to its pre-1997 borders—before it added 14 states, including three former Soviet republics: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. And it is determined to stand its ground. This isn’t just about Ukraine:

“Moscow demands no more eastward expansion and an end to Nato military activity in Eastern Europe. It has also called for all US forces to leave Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the Baltics.”

If NATO appeases Putin on Ukraine, his demands will only escalate.

Editor’s note: We did an explainer on Ukraine which offers more history and context of this conflict.

Ok, where are we now?

Troops on the border: There are a total of 150,000 Russian troops knocking on Ukraine’s doors—including 100,000-plus on the Russian border and 30,000 who are engaged in military drills in Belarus, close to Ukraine. They are equipped with everything “from tanks and artillery to air power and naval support.” Satellite images released by a private company Maxar Technologies confirm the assessment.

Data point to note: The UK estimates that 60% of Russia's land forces are parked near Ukraine's borders with Russia and Belarus.

Map to note: This is where the Russian troops are positioned:

The “deescalation”: Earlier this week, Russia claimed that it was moving troops back to bases—after the completion of drills. But European and US officials insist the claim is false: “Every indication we have now is they mean only to publicly offer to talk, and make claims about de-escalation, while privately mobilising for war.” OTOH, the Russians say, “This is a process that will take some time”—and the troops have to be withdrawn on a schedule: They “can't just take to the air and all fly away.”

Evidence to note: Russia released videos of troops withdrawing from the region of Crimea—and said they were returning to their bases. What it failed to mention: These bases are located closer to the Ukrainian border than their positions in Crimea. Also: satellite images show a long pontoon bridge built in the last few days across the River Pripyat in Belarus. Why this matters: the bridge will dramatically cut the time needed to reach the Ukrainian border and avoid population centres. To sum up, there is no hard evidence to back Moscow’s claims.

A flashpoint in Donbas? The border region has been mired in a low-grade conflict between Ukrainian troops and Russian-backed separatists since the last invasion—claiming 14,000 lives. And it may become the tinderbox that ignites a new war. Putin has been focused on “atrocities” committed by Ukraine in Donbas, calling them a “genocide.” Tensions escalated to shelling yesterday—with both sides accusing the other of violating the ceasefire. More alarmingly, a Kremlin spokesperson said: “It’s clear that the situation in the Donbas is ramping up. The situation at the borders of Russia may ignite at any moment.”

Point to note: Western intelligence has long warned that Russia is planning a “false flag attack”—and the UK described the Donbas allegations “a blatant attempt by the Russian government to fabricate pretexts for invasion.” Al Jazeera notes that the so-called Ukrainian attacks on separatists are getting wide publicity in Russia:

“There is a connection here to the warnings that have been given by the US and NATO about a possible pretext for major action by Russian forces massed around Ukraine’s borders … all it needs is one incident which could be an excuse for Russia to take action, not necessarily a full invasion but action in the disputed areas held by the Russian-backed separatists.”

The timeline: The latest US estimate claims that the invasion has been postponed by 4-5 days—and will likely come after the Beijing Olympics and a key security conference between US and its European allies in Munich.

Chart to note: In case of an invasion, Ukrainian troops will be hopelessly outnumbered, as this comparison shows:

So an invasion is inevitable?

There are many experts who argue that Putin will not walk into Ukraine—and there are two versions of this argument:

One: The costs of an all-out invasion is simply too high—and will achieve the opposite of what Putin wants most: for NATO to move away from its borders. Atlantic Council’s Harlan Ullman argues:

“Putin also knows that an armed attack or aggressive use of force will make any chance of his achieving both his priorities even less likely than landing an astronaut on the sun. He also knows that the costs to Russia and to him personally will be high and possibly unaffordable. Sanctions and further isolation will hurt.”

Also this: There is no exit strategy if he does take over Ukraine—and no Russian president wants a repeat of Afghanistan. As one retired US general notes: “The Ukrainians will fight and inflict major losses on the Russians… This is going to be hard for Russia—and they are basically alone.”

Point to note: There is virtually no support for an invasion within Russia: just 8% think Russia should send military forces to fight Ukraine—and only 9% think Russia should train or equip separatist forces with Russian arms. More importantly, this sentiment is shared by Putin’s own political base:

“Support for armed intervention has fallen by nearly half since 2016. And that drop has occurred among supporters of Putin’s United Russia Party, Communists and the nationalist LDPR party alike. Among those most nostalgic for the Soviet Union, for whom restoration of the Soviet sphere of influence could be expected to resonate most, fewer than 10% want to see Russian troops fight in Ukraine.”

Two: The other version points out that Russia has not engaged in an all-out war for over two decades—preferring limited military engagement in places like Georgia and Syria. Even its previous invasion of Ukraine was relatively bloodless—relying on mercenaries, undercover Russian soldiers and separatists—and limited to taking over Crimea. 

Harun Yilmaz in Al Jazeera argues that the real target of the troop build-up is not Ukraine—but NATO which is being pressured to come to the negotiating table:

“Moscow wants to force Western countries to finally sit down for negotiations on issues of European security. And this strategy seems to be working. Since 1991, this is the first time the West has engaged seriously with Russia to discuss European security.”

A wear-and-tear strategy? A variation on the above theme is that Putin is playing the waiting game. While he may pull back the troops now, their very presence has sent the message he wanted. A leading Russian academic argues:

“What’s important is this suspense, this feeling of a prewar situation… People are spoiled by an overly long peace. They think of security as a given, as something that is attained for free, rather than something that must be negotiated. This is a mistake.”

Irrespective of what happens next, NATO now has to take Russia’s demand for a new security arrangement in Eastern Europe seriously. Hence, the big picture strategy is this: “keep the threat of war ever-present, and thus compel negotiations that Western officials have avoided until now.”

The bottomline: A war in Europe would be a disaster for the entire world, but returning to old Cold War spheres of influence is equally unacceptable—especially for the Eastern European countries viewed by Putin as lost Russian property. What everyone is keeping an eye on: What will Russia’s BFF China do?

Reading list

BBC News has a good overview of the current situation. Also on BBC News: Five possible ways out of this present conflict. The Atlantic Council and Al Jazeera offer strong arguments against a possible invasion. New York Times has a must-read on Putin’s timetable—which may be very different from those in the West. Washington Post looks at the lack of popular support for war within Russia. For more background, check out our previous explainer. This Diplomat op-ed explains why Beijing will never support an invasion.