Researched by: Sara Varghese

Maldives is a “strategic asset”?

It’s all about location, location, location. Maldives is located in a key position in the Indian Ocean—and straddles important sea routes of communication: 

• It is important to India because the nation lies barely 70 nautical miles away from Minicoy island in Lakshadweep—and 300 nautical miles away from our western coast.
• Maldives became significant to China when President Xi took power in 2013—and launched the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The multi-billion dollar global project is a wildly ambitious plan to connect Asia, Africa and Europe with overland corridors and maritime sea lanes. (We explained it here)
• Maldives is also close to Diego Garcia—a UK overseas territory and military outpost for the United States in the Indian Ocean. That’s why the US and Maldives signed a defense agreement in 2020—the first that it has signed with any country other than India.

But it’s always been our close ally, right?

Yes, India and Maldives enjoy a close relationship that stretches back to its independence in 1965—when New Delhi was the first to recognise its sovereignty. But as with all long-term relationships, its had several rocky moments—all of which involve China:

• Over the decades, New Delhi has played the role of the loyal friend in crisis. The two countries first became close back in 1988—when India sent troops to save President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom from a military coup. India also was key to relief efforts after the tsunami hit Maldives in 2004—and later during a drinking water crisis in 2014. 
• In 2009, the relationship was sealed with a defense agreement signed by then President Mohamed Nasheed. The deal integrated the Maldives military with India’s coastal defence network.
• But things started to sour with China’s entry into the picture in 2013—which is also the year that Abdulla Yameen became president.
• Yameen inked a free trade agreement with China—and became more confrontational in his relationship with New Delhi. Example: He returned two Indian helicopters that were gifted to the coast guard. 
• Adding insult to injury: In 2017, three Chinese warships docked in the Maldives for joint training sessions.
• But in 2018, calm was restored when Yameen was defeated in the elections by current President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih—who has unabashedly embraced an “India First” foreign policy.

Key point to note: Thanks to the trade deal signed with Beijing by Yameen, Maldives now owes China $1.4 billion—though others estimate it is as high as $3.1 billion, if you include private loans. This is a signature element of China’s ‘debt diplomacy’—which traps small nations into becoming dependent by loaning large sums of money (explained here). It is one reason why Solih has been scrambling to take aid instead from India—which has doled out pandemic assistance plus $500 million for key projects. New Delhi has also loaned Malé around $1.3 billion in the past three years.

So what’s with this ‘India Out’ campaign?

There has always been simmering resentment at India’s Big Brother role—and its military presence in the country. Solih’s open preference for New Delhi has exacerbated this anger—and he is accused of “allowing Indian boots on the ground”, and “compromising the sovereignty” of the nation. 

Return of Yameen: The movement, however, got fresh momentum when former prez Yameen was recently released from prison in November—after being cleared of embezzlement charges. Now, the protests have become noisier and more visible. One analyst explains:

“The ‘India Out’ campaign has become more politically active because now they have a leader, a strong face, with Yameen. That wasn’t there before. Now it is no longer a civil society movement. It is definitely a political movement.”

The upcoming elections: The stakes for Yameen are high with both the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for next year. He used similar anti-India rhetoric before his ascension to power in 2013. And there are allegations that Yameen is being backed by the Chinese government. Point to note: Other opposition parties do not support the ‘India Out’ campaign—and consider it irresponsible.

A controversial harbour: Last year, Solih inked a deal with New Delhi to build and maintain a coastguard harbour and dockyard at Uthuru Thilafalhu—a strategically located atoll near Malé. There were immediate fears—raised by the opposition—that this is really an Indian military base in disguise. The chief of Maldivian defence forces was forced to clarify: 

“I want to be very clear on this point. I take this opportunity to provide assurance there is no plan to allow establishment of a foreign military base in Maldives, whether on a permanent basis, or temporary basis.”

To be fair: This is not just a case of overblown paranoia. The Solih government has been extremely secretive about the terms of the agreement, as one opposition leader points out:

“An agreement or arrangement that is made with a development partner has to be shared with Parliament and approved. That is a law, in fact it is a part of the Constitution. And the government refuses to share any documents… They just say it is a national security issue and we can’t give details. and that’s the void that is filled by concern here and criticism and at times, protest as well.”

Not helping matters at all: The ruling party members in Parliament are considering a new law that will criminalise protests “that affect the country’s relations with other nations”—and it is clearly targeting the ‘India Out’ movement. It will slap a fine of 20,000 Maldivian Rufiyaa plus a six-month jail term on anyone who claims that Maldives is under the political, economic or military control of another country. As Indian Express notes, such a move is almost guaranteed to stoke anti-India sentiments:

“This can only hand the opposition a stick to beat the MDP with, and whip up more anti-India sentiment. In the present atmosphere, it would not be a surprise if an Indian hand is seen behind the legislation, heightening suspicions that the MDP is putting people’s rights at stake to please India.”

The bottomline: India is one of the largest investors in Maldives—and it cannot be easily cast aside either by Yameen or Beijing. Not unless its greatest ally—the current government—pulls foolish stunts that turn an electoral tactic into a genuine grassroots movement. If that happens, the Bollywood elite can expect angry protests when they take their next glitzy holiday.

Reading list

The Diplomat has an excellent overview of the political history of the relationship between India and Maldives. The Hindu offers an explainer on the ‘India Out’ movement. This Lowy Institute column explains why “sovereignty” is so important to Maldives and its citizens. Indian Express has more on why other opposition parties are reluctant to back the ‘India Out’ movement. The Wire has the most details on the Uthuru Thilafalhu harbour deal. For something different: Check out Scroll’s delightful piece on the unexpected historical connection between Maldives and Goa.