First, the big picture

The overarching principle of Chinese foreign policy is pragmatism. As long as Beijing’s interests are secure, it is entirely indifferent to what kind of government it is in bed with—be it a dictatorship or democracy:

“While Americans try to make other societies more like America’s, the Chinese don’t much care what kind of government another country has, or what it might be doing to its own people, as long as it’s not causing trouble for China. The Chinese viewpoint—leaving foreign peoples under brutal regimes to their fate—may seem callous. Yet the strategy has a degree of pragmatism. The Chinese simply deal with other governments as they are, not how they wish them to be. That allows Beijing to sidestep ideological hang-ups and forge ties to successive regimes—as in Myanmar, where it got on with the junta, then the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and then the junta again, without much fuss.”

So it is an ideal replacement for the United States—and it has no historical baggage that can get in its way, unlike Russia which has a past occupation to contend with. And the quid pro quo in a cozy relationship with Afghanistan is crystal-clear:

“With the U.S. withdrawal, Beijing can offer what Kabul needs most: political impartiality and economic investment. Afghanistan in turn has what China most prizes: opportunities in infrastructure and industry building — areas in which China’s capabilities are arguably unmatched — and access to $1 trillion in untapped mineral deposits, including critical industrial metals such as lithium, iron, copper and cobalt.”

Lots of sweet talk: This explains why the two sides have been cooing at each other. Recently, when Foreign Minister Wang Yi met top Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Baradar, Yi said: 

“China, as Afghanistan’s largest neighbor, has always respected Afghanistan’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, adhered to non-interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and pursued a friendly policy toward the entire Afghan people.”

And Baradar responded in kind: 

“China has always been a reliable friend of the Afghan people… The Afghan Taliban will never allow any force to use the Afghan territory to engage in acts detrimental to China.”

Point to note: China has not yet recognised the Taliban government, but it is expected to be among the first to do so—along with Russia.

The big question: Will this early romance go the distance? Here’s what China stands to lose and gain.

The big Beijing upside

There are three key benefits to a close relationship with a Taliban government

Minerals, minerals, minerals: The global economy is driven by the technology industry—which in turn relies on high-tech chips and large-capacity batteries. These require a variety of rare minerals such as lithium, rare earths and copper. These are also critical for the global switch to more green energy. Guess who is sitting on mineral deposits worth over $1 trillion—including the world’s largest lithium reserves? China, in turn, is a major buyer of the world’s industrial metals and minerals. Afghanistan offers an unparalleled opportunity to invest in the country’s mineral sector—and transport the riches back home to fuel its economic engine.

Road to Kabul: Beijing has invested billions of dollars into its Belt and Road Initiative—which is building overland routes for road and rail transportation that connects China to Iran and Turkey via Central Asia. Adding Afghanistan to that strategic route—which currently runs through Pakistan—would open up a shorter land route to access markets in the Middle East. A road through Afghanistan also allows China to side-step Central Asian countries closely aligned to Russia. According to India Today, Indian intelligence reports indicate that Beijing is already considering an extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor with a road that connects Peshawar to Kabul.

Pressure on Taiwan: The United States’ ugly exit from Afghanistan is being viewed with great anxiety by its closest allies in Asia—including South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. All three rely on US military might to keep them safe from an aggressive China. And Beijing has been quick to paint the Afghan exit as evidence that America is an inherently weak and untrustworthy bada bhai. The government-run media have been quick to draw parallels to Taiwan—which China claims as part of its own territory. The Global Times editor tweeted:

“After the fall of the Kabul regime, the Taiwan authorities must be trembling. Don’t look forward to the US to protect them. Taipei officials need to quietly mail-order a Five-Star Red Flag from the Chinese mainland. It will be useful one day when they surrender to the PLA.”

As Brookings fellow Ryan Hass notes:

“The proximate focus of Chinese efforts will likely be in seeking to undermine the psychological confidence of the Taiwan people in their own future. Beijing would like to advance a narrative inside Taiwan that the United States is distant and unreliable, Taiwan is isolated and alone, and Taiwan’s only path to peace and prosperity runs through Beijing. Chinese propaganda outlets almost certainly will seek to use events in Afghanistan to push their preferred narrative inside Taiwan.”

Point to note: For all the bluster, militarily speaking, Taiwan is hardly more vulnerable to a Chinese invasion today. And according to Biden, the US retreat from Afghanistan will enable it to better fend off the threats from Russia and China. All of which points to a bigger focus on the Pacific Asian region—and therefore Taiwan. That said, Afghanistan reminded everyone that the US has cut-and-run in almost every major war since Vietnam, and its assurances will carry far less weight in the world. 

Beijing’s big downside

The twin threats to this budding love affair are extremism and instability. 

Islamic extremism: In recent years, Beijing has been rounding up Uighurs, its Muslim minority, and throwing them into detention camps. These are located in the Xinjiang province—right on the border of Afghanistan. And China has also been fretting about an Uighur group called the East Turkestan Islamic Movement based in Afghanistan—and believes the group encouraged Uighurs inside China to engage in terrorist acts and trained fighters in camps outside. As long as Afghanistan was the US’ problem, it could be relied on keeping these kinds of extremist groups in check. Now, it will have to rely on the Taliban’s far less reliable assurances. 

Also, there is a jarring dissonance between its own repression of Muslims and a close relationship with a self-styled Islamic Emirate—whose victory has been a big boost to extremist groups around the world. As one expert notes:

“Other jihadist groups have begun to take sympathies with the Uighurs and their plight within China. I think that actually the bigger threat to China is outside jihadist groups who may have begun to perceive China as an enemy of Islam.”

Instability: While Afghanistan’s potential riches may be alluring, there is little evidence that the Taliban will be able to deliver the kind of stability required for their extraction. For example, a $3 billion Chinese investment to develop one of the world’s largest copper deposits at Mes Aynak—and build a power plant, railway and other infrastructure—has been stalled for years. The reason: insurgent activity in the surrounding province. Already in next-door Pakistan, Chinese engineers working on development projects have become targets for extremists. It is unclear whether the Taliban will be any better at keeping the Chinese safe. 

Most experts agree that the Taliban will have to deal with some period of domestic strife. And the transition from being an insurgent military to a government-in-power is likely to expose schisms within a movement that looks misleadingly unified. Also, the methods that may be used by the Taliban to ensure order—say, public executions—may test even Beijing’s indifference to human rights.

The bottomline: China wants to be the first great power to assert its sway over the “graveyard of empires”—without putting a single military boot on the ground. That’s a big and beautiful dream. And it may just remain one.

Reading list

The Atlantic has an excellent take on the new Chinese world order—and whether it can succeed. A former colonel in the Chinese army, Zhou Bho, explains why Afghanistan is a huge opportunity for Beijing—and one it can confidently seize—in the New York Times. Bloomberg News via The Print has the best analysis of Afghanistan’s mineral riches—and the opportunity for China. NPR has the best analysis of China’s worries about terrorism. Brookings Institute looks at the lesson for Taiwan, while BBC News reports on the increasing anxiety among US allies. Former diplomat Shyam Saran offers a thought-provoking take on why India should give Pakistan a long rope to hang itself over Afghanistan.