Tell me about this government... 

The Taliban announced the top leaders of its new government in a hastily called news conference last night. It included zero women, one member of an ethnic minority—and lots of faces from the old regime. The most powerful are veteran hardliners—and the newcomers include one of the most-wanted terrorists in the world. The spokesperson insists these are “temporary” appointments—but did not say how long it will remain in power. 

Here are the five you need to know:

Haibatullah Akhundzada: He has been appointed the supreme leader of the Taliban and of the so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—which is a spiritual rather than political position. However, the Islamic legal scholar—who apparently holds final authority over the group’s political, religious and military affairs—has not been seen in public since he became leader in 2016. His whereabouts are unknown, and rumours were that he fell gravely ill after contracting Covid in June.

Mullah Hasan Akhund: is the new Prime Minister. He is one of the four men who originally formed the Taliban in 1994—and was very close to its founder Mullah Omar. He served as foreign minister and deputy prime minister in the previous government between 1996-2001. A longtime head of the group’s powerful leadership council, Rehbari Shura, he is a known hard-liner—and signals a return to the Taliban’s extremely rigid ideological policies. Akhund is the man who infamously ordered the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in 2001. He is also among the oldest Taliban leaders.

Abdul Ghani Baradar: is now the deputy prime minister. He led the Taliban insurgency after they were toppled by the US—and spent eight years in a Pakistani prison. He was released in 2018 to help move the peace process forward—and has led the negotiations with the US and its allies in Doha. He is seen as the moderate face of the Taliban—and the one best suited to negotiate with other countries, be it the US or China.

Sirajuddin Haqqani: has been appointed as the Interior Minister (equivalent of a Home Minster)—a powerful position handed to a man who is on the FBI’s most wanted list. After the death of his father, Jalaluddin, he took over the Haqqani network—which is responsible for the most violent attacks against Afghan forces and their Western allies in recent years. The Haqqani network—which oversees the Taliban’s military and financial strategy—is one of the region's most powerful militant groups. A retired US general says:

“I do not believe that anyone in the West fully understands the reach of the Haqqani network. It is the single most impressive nonstate militant group I have ever seen, with the exception of ISIS in the first two years of the caliphate.”

Mohammad Yaqoob: is the new defence minister and son of Taliban founder Mullah Omar. At 30, he is the youngest of the Taliban leaders, and most of his public comments have been moderate. As Taliban fighters advanced across the country, Yaqoob urged them not to harm Afghan officials or loot their homes.

So what does this tell us about the ‘new’ Taliban…

A divided government: The obvious message is that it signals a return to the roots of its core ideology and traditional leadership. But the careful division of posts also reflects a significant split between the militant Haqqani network and the so-called Kandahar group. While the likes of Baradar and Yaqoob led the negotiations with the West—promising moderation and inclusivity—the Haqqani wing led the military onslaught which resulted in a shockingly easy victory. And its rise to prominence is not exactly welcome: “The Kandahar and Zabul faction was previously more powerful in the decision making process, but now the Haqqani group is more dominant as they seized control of Kabul.” 

According to Indian media reports, the formation of the government was delayed by a widening rift between the two factions. A “Kabul watcher” told Hindustan Times:

“The [Haqqani Network] has told Baradar to back off as they won Kabul and have dominant control of the Afghan capital. Mullah Yaqoob is still in Kandahar and there is utter confusion over government formation with ultra-conservative traditional Taliban elements who do not want to give up filial ties with Al Qaeda coming to the fore.”

A Pakistani hand? Former Afghan vice president Amrullah Saleh—who is on the run—sent the UK tabloid Daily Mail a dispatch where he claimed:

“[The Taliban] are being micromanaged by Pakistan's notorious intelligence agency, the ISI. The Taliban's spokesperson receives directions, literally every hour, from the Pakistani embassy. It is the Pakistanis who are in charge as effectively a colonial power. But this is not going to last because they and their clients will not be able to erect a functioning economy or create a civil service.”

What is well-established is the fact that the Haqqani Network is extremely close to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI). And that it reflects Islamabad’s hostility toward India—which included launching a suicide attack on our Kabul embassy in 2008:

“The Haqqani Network is widely viewed as a proxy of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI. Under the command of Yaqoob, the mainstream Taliban’s accommodating attitude toward India is a direct threat to Pakistan’s ability to project strategic depth through the Taliban against India. The two factions’ divergent attitudes mean that Pakistan will likely view Haqqani’s influence within the Taliban as critical to its interests.”

Point to note: Indian media outlets like Indian Express are framing the appointment of Sirajuddin Haqqani as a clear win for Pakistan—claiming that the Doha negotiators have clearly been “sidelined.” And many such publications point to the arrival of the ISI chief Lt General Faiz Hameed in Kabul—just days before the government was announced—as a sign that the agency “handpicked the cabinet.” But none of these claims have any sources attributed to them. For example, this recent one from the Deccan Herald:

“Going by the ‘news’ making the rounds in the Afghan capital, the Pakistani embassy has been relaying instructions from Islamabad/Rawalpindi to Kabul on an ‘hourly basis’. In so many words, the Pakistani embassy has become the postman for the leaderships of Pakistan and Taliban.”

The bottomline: Whether Pakistan handpicked the government or not, its survival will depend on how the Taliban manages its internal divide—between the faction that wants a new beginning and the other that only knows how to fight.

Reading list

BBC News offers an overview of the new government, while Al Jazeera has more on its key leaders and a profile of Baradar. Wall Street Journal (paywall) has an excellent report on the recent rise of the Haqqani Network. This 2020 Atlantic Council piece has the most on the divide between the moderates and the Haqqani wing. For a more concise take, check out this more recent Reuters report. As we mentioned, Indian media have focused on the role of Pakistan, including the Hindustan Times, Indian Express and India Today. For a US analysis, check out Brookings Institution.