The TLDR: This Friday, the leaders of the United States, Australia, Japan and India will hold the first-ever Quad summit. What unites all of them: An immediate need to push back at China, which has been increasingly aggressive over the past couple of years. But the stakes are even higher for India—which is both critical to the alliance and the most vulnerable, as it is the only member that shares a long land border with China.

What’s the Quad again?

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—which is an informal strategic dialogue among the United States, India, Japan and Australia—was first initiated in 2004 to help coordinate the post-tsunami recovery. 

However, it’s never had much military or strategic clout. One big reason: Back in 2007, when the four countries held their first joint naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal, Australia hastily backed down after Beijing raised objections. And its efforts to rejoin since have been rebuffed by New Delhi—which too has been reluctant to cosy up too much with the US in case it upset China.

The Malabar drill: The big turning point came during the pandemic as the four nations drew closer together. And in November, they staged an annual joint naval exercise known as the Malabar drill—joined for the first time by Australia since 2007. Why this mattered: It marked a new level of military coordination between the four countries. Talks are nice, but big warships doing joint maneuvers in the Bay of Bengal is something else. Of course, all of it was directed at Beijing.

Nobody is lovin’ China

Each of the countries has their own problems with Beijing—and they’ve been growing over the past 12 months. Here’s what’s upsetting each of them—which in turn laid the ground for this first-ever summit:

Japan: Relations between the two nations have always been frosty, but they have chilled further due to territorial disputes. Both Tokyo and Beijing claim the Senkaku Islands, but Japan has administered them since 1972. And China has been increasingly assertive—with its naval vessels spending record amounts of time hovering in the waters around the islands.

Also not helping: China aggressively staking its claim to 3.5 million square kilometres of the South China Sea—which has also triggered tensions with Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam.

Australia: Relations between Canberra and Beijing have been spiralling downwards—with China blocking key Australian exports, including beef, wine and timber from entering its market. The trigger for these punitive measures: Prime Minister Scott Morrison called for an international investigation into the origins of Covid-19—and expressed concern over human rights violations in Hong Kong and Xinjiang (where Uighurs have been held in detention camps).

The US: Relations reached a new low during the Trump administration—which got into a bitter trade war with Beijing. But the Biden administration shows no signs of changing course. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken cited the US relationship with Beijing as "the biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century,” adding:

"China is the only country with the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to seriously challenge the stable and open international system—all the rules, values, and relationships that make the world work.”

Point to note: The fact that Biden chose the Quad summit—over NATO or any of its other allies—as his first major multilateral engagement sends a big signal about his seriousness. That said, the US is not interested in breaking ties with Beijing but a strong multi-nation alliance in China’s backyard may allow it to negotiate from a position of strength. From the point of view of Japan and Australia, such an alliance keeps the US closely engaged in the region—as a counterweight to China. 

A big move for India

An uneasy alliance: India has always been ambivalent about the Quad. And it was the last of the four to confirm PM Modi’s participation in the summit—which happened only on Tuesday. That’s because the stakes are far higher for us than the others: 

• The US has never been a reliable ally. New Delhi has long feared “provoking China” given that the “U.S. commitment to the security of the region is uncertain,” often changing from one administration to another—which makes it extremely cautious about abandoning its non-aligned position.
• India recently signed a big defence deal with Russia—and a US Congressional report has already warned that it may trigger US sanctions. Moscow in turn will not look kindly on New Delhi moving closer to Washington. 
• India has already paid a high price for appeasing the US by going along with its sanctions on Iran—which has sealed a major economic and security partnership with China. Beijing’s stranglehold now extends all the way from its borders to the strategic Iranian port of Chabahar.
• And as some national security experts argue, India is the only Quad member that shares an undemarcated 3,500-km land border with China. And they link the incursions on that border directly to India’s closer relationship with the US and its allies—calling it “a rude reminder that India’s security concerns lie in its northern borders, not the west Pacific.”

OTOH: The New Delhi did a “huge turnaround” and got off the fence for the very same reason, as other foreign policy observers point out: “China’s aggression in Ladakh was a major catalyst in India not just coming fully on board but agreeing to lend a public military angle to the Quad.”

And the emphasis on joint naval activity sent Beijing an important signal: “[T]heir cooperation with the US and Japanese navies was a reminder to China that if you put pressure on the land borders, you better be prepared to meet us in the naval realm.”

A new Quad-tastic equation?

There are undoubted advantages to strengthening India’s relationship to the Quad. 

The vaccine benefit: The first salvo aimed at China will involve Covid vaccines—which is key to Beijing’s attempt to earn goodwill in poorer nations like Brazil. US officials have signalled that the summit will seal financing agreements to boost India’s vaccine manufacturing capacity—including deals with US companies such as Johnson & Johnson and Novavax. This will grant New Delhi’s immediate big ask of its Quad allies. An Indian official earlier told Reuters:

“Serum's Novavax partnership holds ‘the key to the Quad’s diplomatic alliance in vaccines and push China out of regional vaccine sales’... ‘The focus is also on making sure the Quad alliance secures all the key markets for vaccines.’”

A military benefit? Given the huge military differential between India and China, the Quad may offer the only counter-measure to rein in the dragon. As a former naval chief lays it out:

“If India is not to cede ground physically or diplomatically, it must muster all elements of its ‘comprehensive national power’, including the maritime, and create a strong negotiating position. Apart from the balance of forces on land favouring China, there is also the Beijing-Islamabad Axis that awaits activation. Keeping tensions confined to the Himalayan arena is, therefore, not only militarily advantageous to China but a continental focus also helps to keep India contained in a ‘South-Asia box’.”

Certainly, over the past year, the Indian government has made a series of moves to tighten its maritime cooperation with Quad members. One analyst says these are very significant when taken as a whole: “If you don’t look at all these things, you miss the spider web that is being woven beneath.”

OTOH: It is unlikely that the Quad will ever become another NATO or any such closely integrated formal bloc, as the Australian PM made clear:

"This will become a feature of Indo-Pacific engagement. But it's not going to be a big bureaucracy with a big secretariat and those sorts of things. It will be four leaders, four countries, working together constructively for the peace, prosperity and stability of the Indo-Pacific, which is good for everyone in the Indo-Pacific"

And that’s okay: with India for now—given that China appears to be willing to step down on the border. There is no immediate profit in turning the Quad into “some kind of anti-China coalition,” as experts emphasise:

“We want to do much more with our Quad partners, but I don’t think there is going to be too much movement on the military front as long as this disengagement lasts… But if we see any more trouble from China, it’s quite likely that the administration posture on this might shift.”

FYI: The Chinese government has variously described the Quad as “building small circles in the name of multilateralism,” “sea foam” and a “clique” that could start a new Cold War.

The bottomline: The Quad offers at best a partial answer to the biggest question that currently plagues the world: How do you solve a problem like China?

Reading list

• Financial Times and CNN look at the significance of the summit. 
• The South China Morning Post has an excellent deep dive into the potential and limitations of the Quad. 
• This Hindu op-ed is the most sceptical of the value of the Quad for India, calling it a “quagmire.” 
• Both Mint and Quint offer strong arguments against a close alignment with the United States—but propose very different alternative strategies. 
• The Diplomat lays out India’s historical view of the Quad. 
• New York Times looks at the many factors weighing on New Delhi’s mind—as it weighs picking the West over China.
• London Review of Books offers a sobering view of the looming confrontation with China.