The TLDR: Everyone has a problem with China—be it the US, UK, India, Australia or Japan. And they are each pushing back in unprecedented ways—which may mark the beginning of a new cold war. In the midst of this, four of these nations (including India) will soon conduct joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean. Will this mark the symbolic beginning of a global realignment of loyalties? Or will India continue its ‘non aligned’ ways? We assess the state of global geopolitical play.

China’s ‘mean girl’ problem

Much like Regina George, China has long used its immense clout to bully allies and rivals to do its bidding. The two big economic weapons in its arsenal: the mouthwateringly large Chinese market and the global economy’s near-total dependence on ‘Made in China’ goods and investments. Telling fact: China accounts for 13% of world exports and 18% of world market capitalisation. It accounted for 28% of all economic growth worldwide between 2013 and 2018.

In recent months, Beijing has not used that power for good. The series of ‘mean girl’ moves include:

• Hiding information on the Wuhan virus which triggered the pandemic—and continuing to share incomplete or misleading data with the world. 
• Ending Hong Kong’s semi-autonomous status by imposing a draconian national security law.
• Engaging in a dangerous border conflict with India in Ladakh. Recent reports suggest that China has not honoured the agreement for a mutual pullback.
• Asserting its claim to 3.5 million square kilometres of the South China Sea—which has triggered tensions with Malaysia, Taiwan and Japan.

The big pushback

This uber-aggressive posture, however, has been met with far more fierce resistance than Beijing expected. Here’s what’s happened just this week:

• The United States just asked China to shut down its Houston, Texas, consulate—soon after the Justice department arrested two Chinese hackers for stealing Covid-related research. All this comes on the heels of a series of economic sanctions on Chinese companies, and revoking of Hong Kong’s special trade status. 
• Beijing called the latest move “unprecedented escalation” and promised to “react with firm countermeasures.”
• The UK has cancelled its extradition treaty with China, and banned the telecommunications giant Huawei. London has also offered citizenship to almost 3 million Hong Kong residents.
• The US held joint naval exercises with India near the Andaman Islands—along with similar exercises with Australia and Japan near the South China Sea. 
• Defense Secretary Esper described them as measures “to back up the sovereignty of friends and partners and to reassure them that we will be there to defend those things” in the face of ‘China’s bad behaviour'.
• At a virtual India-focused summit, External Affairs minister S. Jaishankar said the US and India “have the ability, while working together today, to shape the world."
• At the same summit, US Foreign Secretary Mike Pompeo declared: “It's important that democracies like ours work together, especially as we see more clearly than ever the true scope of the challenge posed by the Chinese Communist Party”—calling India “a key pillar of President Trump's foreign policy.”

A new Quad-tastic equation?

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—which is an informal strategic dialogue among the United States, India, Japan and Australia—was first initiated in 2004 to help coordinate the post-tsunami recovery. 

However, it’s never had much military or strategic clout. One big reason: Back in 2007, when the four countries held their first joint naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal, Australia hastily backed down after Beijing raised objections. And its efforts to rejoin since have been rebuffed by New Delhi. 

Now, this annual exercise—known as the Malabar drill—is scheduled to be held in November. And this year, New Delhi plans to invite Australia to join the party. If so, it will be the first quasi-military response to the Ladakh incursions—which have so far been met with minor raps on the knuckle. Example: banning apps and limiting Chinese foreign investments.

The up/downside for India

The US is betting big on the Quad to keep China in check. Pompeo recently said: “[the Quad] will prove very important in the efforts ahead, ensuring that China retains only its proper place in the world.” But India has not been keen on formalising this ‘fantastic four’ alliance, and for these reasons: 

• One: the US has never been a reliable ally—and more so under Trump (who may or may not win the coming election). New Delhi has long feared “provoking China at a moment when U.S. commitment to the security of the region is uncertain [that is the primary] reason for caution.” 
• Two: India is gearing up to sign a big defence deal with Russia. If Trump loses in November, that cosy relationship is sure to become a sticking point for the US. Moscow in turn will not look kindly on New Delhi moving closer to Washington. 
• Three: India has already paid a high price for appeasing the US by going along with its sanctions on Iran—which has sealed a major economic and security partnership with China. Beijing’s stranglehold now extends all the way from its borders to the strategic Iranian port of Chabahar.

The upside: Given the huge military differential between India and China, the Quad may offer the only counter-measure to rein in the dragon. As a former naval chief lays it out:

“If India is not to cede ground physically or diplomatically, it must muster all elements of its ‘comprehensive national power’, including the maritime, and create a strong negotiating position. Apart from the balance of forces on land favouring China, there is also the Beijing-Islamabad Axis that awaits activation. Keeping tensions confined to the Himalayan arena is, therefore, not only militarily advantageous to China but a continental focus also helps to keep India contained in a ‘South-Asia box’.”

The bottomline: At the virtual summit—despite all the India-US bhai bhai talk—Jaishankar carefully hedged his bets, saying: "I think the US really has to learn to work with a more multipolar world with more plurilateral arrangements, go beyond the alliance with which it has grown up in the last two generations." In other words—mock naval drills aside—don’t expect New Delhi to climb into bed with Uncle Sam or its allies anytime soon.

Reading List

Both Mint and Quint offer strong arguments against a close alignment with the United States—but propose very different alternative strategies. New York Times reports on the many factors weighing on New Delhi’s mind. The Diplomat lays out India’s view of the Quad. Scroll explains the potentially disastrous consequences of the Iran-China tie-up. Lowy Institute analyses the upcoming Malabar exercises and their significance. London Review of Books offers a sobering view of the looming confrontation with China.