First, the tragedy

The attacks: took place in two locations: at the Abbey gate at the airport, and at a hotel nearby. See the map below:

US officials had issued a warning of an imminent terrorist attack right before it happened. And the US Embassy had urged its citizens outside the airport to leave—specifically citing Abbey Gate. Despite that, thousands were packed right outside—standing knee-deep in filthy water in what looked like a sewage canal, the site of one of the blasts. See what the scene looked like before the blast:

The death toll: There is no official toll for the Afghan casualties—but an Afghan health official in Wall Street Journal puts the number at 90, with many others still fighting for their lives. US casualties included 10 Marines, two soldiers and one sailor—the first since February 2020. If you wish, you can see a horrific clip of the aftermath here (we strongly advise you don’t). 

The US reaction: President Biden promised revenge: “We will not forgive. We will not forget. We will hunt you down and make you pay. Our mission will go on, America will not be intimidated.”—and said he has asked military commanders to make plans to strike assets, leadership and facilities of IS-K. Evacuation flights have already resumed.

The Taliban reaction: Its spokesperson tweeted: “The Islamic Emirate strongly condemns the bombing of civilians at Kabul airport”—which seems to deliberately omit any mention of the dead US troops. Also this: “We strongly condemn this gruesome incident and will take every step to bring the culprits to justice.”

The IS-K response: The group claimed responsibility for the attacks, saying: “[The bomber] managed to reach a large gathering of translators and collaborators with the American army at 'Baran Camp' near Kabul Airport and detonated his explosive belt among them.” They named one of the militants as Abdul Rahman al-Logari—which suggests he is Afghan. 

Next, the Islamic State-Khorasan

Origins: The full name of the group is Islamic State Khorasan Province—and media outlets variously use IS-K, ISIS-K and ISKP to refer to it. It is the Central Asian affiliate of the Islamic State (infamous for its brutal rule over Syria)—and was formed in 2015. It was set up by recruiting unhappy members of the Taliban and other extremist groups in the region. Many of its members come from Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Current activity: of the IS-K has been on the wane in recent years. Its numbers have fallen to about 1,500 to 2,000 fighters—half of what it was at its peak in 2016. In 2019, 343 attacks were attributed to the group—but that count fell to just 11 in 2020. But those 11 were significant and spectacular events:

“In April 2020, there was a deadly attack on a gurdwara in Kabul, followed by a suicide bombing in the maternity ward of a Kabul hospital. There were other attacks in Kabul – at the University, a clinic of the Medecins Sans Frontiers, the Jalalabad prison, a funeral procession of a police officer in Nangarhar.”

The group has also staged attacks in next door Pakistan—22 in 2019 and 13 in 2020. And they appear to be staging some kind of a comeback. The Islamic State conducted 77 attacks in Afghanistan in the first four months of this year, up from 21 in the same period in 2020. This included the killing of 80 schoolgirls in May.

IS-K vs Taliban: The group has long been a bitter foe of the Taliban which has fiercely resisted its expansion within Afghanistan—even killing its top military leader who was being held in prison when it took over. The reason: “the Islamic State... considers the Taliban ‘apostates’ because of their willingness to negotiate with the US, their apparent pragmatism and their failure to apply Islamic law with sufficient rigour.” When Taliban took Kabul, ISIS was one of the few jihadist groups to condemn its victory, accusing it of “being bad Muslims and agents of the US.”

Point to note: Al Qaeda and its South Asian affiliate are close allies of the Taliban—and therefore also at odds with the IS-K. But many of IS-K’s commanders previously were members of Al Qaeda. Also: The Islamic State is currently more influential than its rival: “It is clear that the Islamic State is the bigger threat, in Iraq and Syria, in Asia or Africa. It is clear that ISIS is spread more widely and is more attractive to the new generations.”

Motivation for the attack: The attacks at the airport reflect IS-K’s ability to pose a significant danger despite their diminished ranks—a message it undoubtedly wanted to send, as one expert notes: 

“They achieve several things: they hit legitimate targets (from their perspective), they send a signal of still being a force to be reckoned with and they challenge the Taliban’s state project by highlighting that the group can’t secure Kabul.”

And the airport offered the perfect target:

“The crowds, planes and infrastructure at the airport provide an obvious venue for the kind of mass-casualty attack that IS has become known for… the situation was also a ‘perfect meeting of diverse targets’ in Afghanistan: the US military, Afghans who have helped the western effort and are therefore seen as collaborators, and the Taliban, which ISKP sees as ‘apostates’.”

Point to note: In Quint, former Indian intelligence official Anand Arni posits a covert connection between Islamabad and IS-K:

“Pakistan’s attempts to prop up the IS-K or to create a new entity that is essentially influenced by the LeT fits in with the long-held expectation that Pakistan will create a pressure group to keep the Taliban in check if the peace deal works. It also provides deniability for that [terrorist attacks] which cannot be attributed to the Taliban or the Haqqani Network (HN) and helps to counter CIA-equipped and funded militias.” 

Finally, an India connection

The IS-K has always targeted its propaganda at the Indian subcontinent, as security blog War on the Rocks notes:

“The Islamic State targets South Asian audiences with its propaganda. Sawt-al-Hind (Voice of Hind), an online pro-Islamic State propaganda magazine, targeted Indian Muslims during communal riots in New Delhi in February 2020. The monthly magazine explores controversial regional and local affairs (e.g., developments at the Ayodhya temple, a highly contentious issue between Hindus and Muslims in India since the early 1990s).”

And three Indian recruits were part of one of its most prominent attacks in Jalalabad in August 2020—when car bombs were detonated at a prison’s entrance by gunmen in an attempt to free ISIS prisoners. According to ORF:

“One of the three Indians who allegedly took part in the attack was reportedly a trained doctor, Ijas Kallukettiya Purayil, who was on India’s National Investigation Agency’s (NIA) most wanted list. According to the NIA, Purayil was part of a 22-member contingent of men and women from the southern Indian state of Kerala that left the state’s Kasargod district led by one Abdul Rashid Abdulla to join the IS in Afghanistan.” 

And at least one of them was involved in an attack on a Sikh gurdwara in Kabul—which resulted in 25 casualties. 

The bottomline: A former Afghan security official says, “Afghanistan has now become the Las Vegas of the terrorists, of the radicals and of the extremists”—and the Taliban doesn’t have the ability to rein in all the players at this blood-soaked casino. The Taliban’s victory may well have opened the door for a terrorist free-for-all that no one can control.

Reading list

Wall Street Journal via Mint and NPR report on the attacks. CSIS offers a detailed profile of IS-K, while the New York Times offers a quick overview. See The Guardian for an update of its most current activities and strength. War on the Rocks has the best analysis of the bouquet of jihadist groups who will pose a threat to South Asian security in the wake of Taliban’s rise. ORF Online offers an excellent take on the implications of IS-K’s rise for India. Anand Arni in Quint lays out IS-K’s connections to Lashkar-e-Taiba and Pakistan.